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Karen M. Tani

Welfare and Rights Before the Movement:
Rights as a Language of the State
abstract. In conversations about government assistance, rights language often emerges as
a danger: when benefits become “rights,” policymakers lose flexibility, taxpayers suffer, and the
poor lose their incentive to work. Absent from the discussion is an understanding of how, when,
and why Americans began to talk about public benefits in rights terms. This Article addresses
that lacuna by examining the rise of a vibrant language of rights within the federal social welfare
bureaucracy during the 1930s and 1940s. This language is barely visible in judicial and legislative
records, the traditional source base for legal-historical inquiry, but amply evidenced by
previously unmined administrative records. Using these documents, this Article shows how
concepts of “welfare rights” filtered through federal, state, and local administrative channels and
into communities around the nation.
This finding contradicts conventional wisdom, which dates the birth of “welfare rights”
language to the 1960s. This Article reveals that as early as 1935, some Americans—government
officials, no less—deliberately and persistently employed rights language in communications
about welfare benefits. In addition to challenging dominant interpretations, this Article identifies
an under-studied aspect of rights language. An abundant “rights talk” literature chronicles and
critiques claimants’ use of rights language. This Article, by contrast, identifies rights language
emanating from government and being used for government purposes. Specifically, this Article
argues that federal administrators used rights language as an administrative tool, a way to solve
tricky problems of federalism and administrative capacity at a time in which poor relief was
shifting from a local to a state and federal responsibility. Thus, this Article not only enriches
debates about the role of rights in contemporary social welfare reforms, but also brings fresh
insights to scholarship on the techniques of administrators and the limits of federal power.
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introduction
In the fall of 1960, the leadership of the federal Social Security
Administration1 was in the unenviable position of having to review, and
potentially to revoke, a state’s multimillion-dollar federal public assistance
grant. Louisiana had amended its Aid to Dependent Children2 plan3 to, in
effect, exclude most illegitimate children.4 Nearly 23,000 children—the vast

1.

2.

3.
4.

316

This agency, formerly named the Social Security Board (SSB), was in charge of
administering all the programs created by the Social Security Act of 1935, including public
assistance. Originally, the agency was independent, but in 1939 it became part of President
Roosevelt’s newly created Federal Security Agency (FSA). The FSA, in turn, became the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). MARTHA DERTHICK, THE
INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS 21-22 (1970).
Throughout the Article, I use the phrase “the Agency” to refer to the Social Security Board and
its successor. Subsequently, I use the acronym “SSB” when referring to the Agency by name.
When the FSA came into being in 1939, the SSB’s General Counsel (GC) became GC
for the entire Federal Security Agency. See ROBERT T. LANSDALE ET AL., THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OLD AGE ASSISTANCE 5 (1939); Interview by Peter A. Corning with Jack
B. Tate, former Gen. Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., in New Haven, Conn. 58 (June-July 1965)
(transcript on file with Oral History Collection of Columbia University). I treat the two
offices interchangeably.
The Social Security Act of 1935, best known for establishing social insurance, created a
system of federal-to-state grants-in-aid for three categories of “unemployable” Americans:
the elderly, the blind, and dependent children. See Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). By the time of the Louisiana
episode, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) had become the most controversial. Despite
efforts to repair its image (e.g., by inserting “families” into its name), the program
encountered vigorous opposition until the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 “end[ed] welfare as we know it.” MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE
OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 317 (2001); see Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). A variant of the child-centered program still exists
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), but Congress replaced the system of federally
supervised matching grants with a flexible block grant system and eliminated open-ended
entitlements. The “adult” programs—Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and a 1950
addition called Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled—also still exist, but are now
under exclusive federal control and have been rolled into a program called Supplemental
Security Income. See generally EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA’S WELFARE STATE: FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1991) (providing an overview of U.S. social welfare policy from the
1930s through the 1980s).
The federal agency used the word “plan” to refer to all the state laws and regulations relating
to public assistance. DERTHICK, supra note 1, at 22.
One statute prohibited payments on behalf of any illegitimate child who shared a mother
with multiple older illegitimate children. Act of July 7, 1960, sec. 1, § 233(C), 1960 La. Acts
634, 634-35. The legislature also excluded from coverage any child living with a mother who
had ever had a child out of wedlock after receiving a welfare check, unless and until the
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majority black—lost their benefits.5 National outrage ensued. Newspapers
chastised Louisiana for its “mean, uncivilized approach.” Public welfare and
civil rights organizations demanded that the federal agency recognize
Louisiana’s noncompliance with federal law and hold a formal hearing.6 News
of the scandal reached as far as Northeast England, where concerned
councilwomen arranged to airlift baby food into New Orleans.7
Louisiana temporarily retreated from its position, cowed by media
condemnation and the eventual threat of federal defunding, but the episode
was an indictment of the federal agency, which had responded with too little,
too late. When the Social Security Administration finally held a hearing,
months after learning about the problem, it did not revoke the state’s grant.
Afterward, states continued to devise ways to reduce and to reconfigure their
welfare populations, confident that they could elude federal sanction. The
episode was also a lesson for the burgeoning welfare rights movement, which
developed alongside these restrictive state laws and drew inspiration from the
black freedom movement.8 It proved, as a bright intern named Bob Cover
explained to a welfare rights think tank in 1967, that the federal agency lacked
either the will or the tools to protect claimants’ rights.9 Despite knowledge of
many potentially illegal state and local welfare practices, the federal agency had
entertained only sixteen conformity hearings in the history of the federal-state
public assistance arrangement, and had no process for providing individual

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

mother proved that she had “ceased illicit relationships” and was “maintaining a suitable
home.” Act of July 7, 1960, sec. 1, § 233(D), 1960 La. Acts 525, 527.
Taryn Lindhorst & Leslie Leighninger, “Ending Welfare as We Know It” in 1960: Louisiana’s
Suitable Home Law, 77 SOC. SERV. REV. 564, 564 (2003).
WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 142 (1965).
This narrative draws on newspaper coverage and scholarly reconstructions. See id. at 137-51;
JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945-1965, at 85-91 (2005); Lisa Levenstein, From Innocent Children to
Unwanted Migrants and Unwed Moms: Two Chapters in the Public Discourse on Welfare in the
United States, 1960-1961, 11 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 10, 10-13 (2000); Lindhorst & Leighninger,
supra note 5, at 576-77; Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised
Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J.
399, 420-21 (1997); British Flying Food to Negroes in South, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1960, at 5;
Louisiana Relief Rolls, CHI. DEFENDER, Sept. 5, 1960, at 10; Sins of the Fathers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1960, at 40; Suffer Little Children, NATION, Sept. 24, 1960, at 171.
FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN
AMERICA 17 (2007).
[Robert Cover], Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
84, 91-92 (1967). Martha Davis identifies Cover as the author. MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL
NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 59-60, 165 n.16
(1993).
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redress.10 For purposes of both vindicating existing rights and establishing new
ones, the federal agency was a dead end. Cover urged instead a turn toward
federal courts, fueling a fire that was already blazing through law schools,
community organizations, and neighborhood law offices.11 Before the decade
was out, “poverty lawyers” would be advancing their clients’ claims before the
highest court in the land.12
Had Cover observed the scene just twenty years earlier—before “welfare”
became synonymous with black single mothers, before states competed to
enact the most restrictive policies, and before public welfare workers
commenced treating poverty as a disability to be professionally expunged13—
his impression of federal welfare administrators would have been different. At

10.
11.

12.

13.
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Cover, supra note 9, at 91-92.
Id. at 93-109. Cover would go on to become one of the foremost legal scholars of his
generation. Interestingly, he is best known not for championing the virtues of judicial
review, but for reminding his peers of the human costs of judicial interpretation. See Robert
M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
Notable cases include New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
(1973), which rejected a preemption challenge to a state law that conditioned Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits on participation in work-related programming;
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), which found no equal protection violation in a state
law that set lower benefit levels for AFDC recipients than for recipients of other need-based
assistance programs; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), which upheld a state law
conditioning AFDC benefits on home inspections; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), which rejected a challenge to a state law that placed a maximum on the amount of
AFDC benefits a family could receive; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which held that
due process required the government to provide a full evidentiary hearing before
terminating an individual’s welfare benefits; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
which found unconstitutional Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and District of Columbia laws
that prohibited new residents from receiving AFDC; and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311
(1968), which struck down a state law that “denie[d] AFDC payments to the children of a
mother who ‘cohabits’ . . . with any . . . able-bodied man.” For a brief history of major welfare
rights cases and the reformers who pushed them toward the courts, see DAVIS, supra note 9, at
99-118. For explorations of the interplay between these Supreme Court decisions and social
welfare policy, see SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990); and R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN
THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994). On the welfare rights movement, see
KORNBLUH, supra note 8; PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); and ANNELISE ORLECK, STORMING CAESARS
PALACE: HOW BLACK MOTHERS FOUGHT THEIR OWN WAR ON POVERTY (2005).
On public assistance policy and administration between the late 1940s and the early 1960s,
see MITTELSTADT, supra note 7, at 52-53; ELLEN REESE, BACKLASH AGAINST WELFARE
MOTHERS: PAST AND PRESENT (2005); and Karen M. Tani, Securing a Right to Welfare:
Public Assistance Administration and the Rule of Law, 1935-1965, at 237 (Sept. 2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Van Pelt Library,
University of Pennsylvania).
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that moment, the federal agency’s Assistant General Counsel, A. Delafield
Smith, was broadcasting to every audience he could find that a right to public
assistance, and ancillary rights of fair and equal treatment, were inscribed in
positive law. As soon as “Government” took action to assure a means of
livelihood for broad classes of needy individuals, “rights and privileges . . .
accrue[d],” he explained to a conference of fellow federal government attorneys
in 1938.14 One might even conclude, he told the 1939 Annual Meeting of the
American Schools of Social Work, that “participation in the public bounty” in
time of need had become “a right or privilege” of “citizenship.”15 The message
was not limited to experts. For example, after consulting with Smith, one
Indiana congressman informed a constituent, concerned about his destitute
mother-in-law, that federally subsidized old-age assistance was the woman’s
legal right; local administrators might hassle her, but she was “entitled” by law
to public payments.16 In short, Smith preached, poor relief was no longer a
matter of discretion, as it was under the old poor law; it no longer depended on
community understandings of desert or adherence to community norms. It had
become a matter of right.
Smith was hardly a voice in the wilderness. Other sources emanating from
Smith’s agency, such as training guides for local welfare workers, went further.
Drafted primarily by professional social workers with the clearance of lawyers,
these guides enumerated rights apart from a basic guarantee of income support
that, with the creation of federal-state welfare programming, were now
established in law. These included the right to submit a formal application for
assistance, the right to receive fair treatment, the right to spend support
payments freely, and the right to keep private one’s reliance on the state.17

14.

15.
16.

17.

Report of the Regional Attorneys Conference, December 5 to 10, 1938, at 78 (Dec. 1938) (on
file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/1). Throughout this Article, “NARA II” refers to the
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. “HEW Records”
refers to the General Records of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the
Federal Security Agency. Citations are given in the form [Record group number]/[Box
number]/[Folder number (where applicable)].
A. Delafield Smith, Interrelationship of Education and Practice in the Development of a
Profession, 1939 ANN. MEETING AM. SCH. SOC. WORK 5 (on file with author).
Letter from George W. Gillie, U.S. Representative from Ind., to W.B. Hays (Mar. 15, 1939)
(on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/26/PA Residence Requirements (1939-1943));
Letter from W.B. Hays to George W. Gillie, U.S. Representative from Ind. (Mar. 12, 1939)
(on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/26/PA Residence Requirements (1939-1943)).
BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE IN COLLABORATION WITH BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS AND AUDITS
AND OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, FED. SEC. AGENCY, MONEY PAYMENTS TO RECIPIENTS OF
OLD-AGE ASSISTANCE, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN, AND AID TO THE BLIND, BUREAU
CIRCULAR NO. 17 (1944); GRACE F. MARCUS, THE NATURE OF SERVICE IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION 30 (Bureau of Pub. Assistance, Fed. Sec. Agency, Pub. Assistance Report
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Some agency sources, especially those issued in the wake of World War II,
went further still: they declared that poor individuals had not just legal rights
but “soci[al]”18 or “human”19 rights—rights to the income, the process, and the
freedom necessary “to live as participating members of the community.”20
These sources disrupt the narrative that scholars of U.S. social welfare
provision have constructed. According to conventional accounts, policymakers
and administrators did their utmost to attach rights rhetoric and rights
practices (automatic, fixed benefits linked to minimally invasive procedures) to
the new social insurance program, Social Security. At the same time, they
deliberately denied those trappings to public assistance, predicting and even
hoping that public assistance clients would bear the stigma associated with
traditional poor relief.21 In short, rights language helped construct and
maintain a “two-track” welfare state.22 Not until the welfare rights movement
and the high tide of legal liberalism, the standard narrative continues, did
Americans use the language of rights to talk about need-based income

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.
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No. 10, 1946) (identifying as a “major operating purpose[]” the “adminis[tration] [of]
assistance as a right” and listing the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act);
Memorandum from the Bureau of Pub. Assistance to the Exec. Dir., Soc. Sec. Bd., Money
Payments to Recipients of Old-Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, and Aid to the
Blind (Jan. 7, 1944) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/75/Regional Miscellaneous—
Folder 21 (Memoranda) (January-December) (1944)) (enumerating the Social Security Act
provisions “directed toward the objective of preserving and maintaining the rights of
individual[]” applicants and recipients); see also Jane M. Hoey, The Contribution of Social
Work to Government, 1941 PROC. NAT’L CONF. SOC. WORK 3, 13 (listing various provisions of
the Act and celebrating “the rights . . . inherent” therein).
See CHARLOTTE TOWLE, COMMON HUMAN NEEDS: AN INTERPRETATION FOR STAFF IN PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REPORT NO. 8, at 36 (1945) (“Whatever the
limitation in our present programs, we can take heart in our labors in the realization that we
are pioneers taking the first steps in the effort to make real man’s claim of right on
society.”).
Id. at iii. This reference to human rights suggests a link between the administration of
domestic social welfare laws and efforts to articulate and defend a set of international human
rights. That link is outside the scope of this Article, but for suggestive reading, see
ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS (2005); MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); and SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
Memorandum from the Bureau of Pub. Assistance to the Exec. Dir., supra note 17. The
federal agency circulated this document, along with MARCUS, supra note 17; TOWLE, supra
note 18; and others, to all the state agencies, with hopes that they would redistribute them
to their local administrative units.
See infra note 82.
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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support.23 And when they did, federal administrators were not conversant in
the dialect.24
This Article25 supports aspects of that account, while also fundamentally
revising the story. It demonstrates that in fact, from the late 1930s through the
late 1940s, some administrators within the federal social welfare bureaucracy
persistently characterized public assistance as a right and its recipients as
rights-holders. But they did not direct this rights language26 at courts or the
poor, inviting as that story may be. Rather, this Article argues, government
officials targeted the thousands of workers administering public assistance at
the ground level, the state and local government employees whom they could
not control but who were crucial to making the New Deal public assistance
programs a meaningful reform.
As New Deal administrators saw it, these low-level workers were inclined
to operate under an old poor law framework, under which those who received
public aid were paupers. Paupers, by definition, sacrificed personal liberty, civil
and political rights, and reputation in exchange for material support. To
borrow the words of citizenship theorist T.H. Marshall, traditional poor relief
“treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the
citizen, but as an alternative to them—as claims which could be met only if the
claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word.”27 Federal

23.

24.
25.

26.

27.

In most accounts, “welfare rights” emerge as an “invention” of the 1960s. See, e.g.,
KORNBLUH, supra note 8, at 14-38. To be fair, Kornbluh’s focus is the “collective and openly
political” articulation of welfare rights; she does not deny the existence of earlier efforts to
pair rights with need-based support. Id. at 17.
This piece of conventional wisdom derives mainly from narratives of the litigation side of
the welfare rights movement. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 9, at 81.
For an exploration of other key questions, including the connection between the rights
language that is the focus of this Article and the rights language of welfare rights activists
and poverty lawyers of the 1960s and 1970s, see Tani, supra note 13.
This phrase is meant to invoke the work of Stuart Scheingold, Hendrik Hartog, Richard
Primus, and others who have described the deep historical roots and many possible valences
and utilities of the term “rights” in American history. See infra Section V.A.
T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1949), reprinted in T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS,
CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 30 (1964), quoted in CHAD ALAN GOLDBERG,
CITIZENS AND PAUPERS: RELIEF, RIGHTS, AND RACE, FROM THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU TO
WORKFARE 2 (2007); see also HUGH HECLO, MODERN SOCIAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND
SWEDEN: FROM RELIEF TO INCOME MAINTENANCE 1 (1974) (describing paupers as “a group
who paid for the support of the community by being stigmatized and set apart as something
less than full citizens”); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 166 (Vintage Books 1993) (1971) (noting that in
England, “relief recipients were denied the franchise until 1918,” and that as late as 1934,
fourteen U.S. states “deprived recipients of the right to vote or hold office”).
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administrators hoped that by explaining the new public assistance program in
rights terms, whether the language of “legal” rights, “citizenship” rights, or
“social” rights, they would trigger a shift in the mindset of local welfare
workers.28 Proper administration would follow. In other words, federal
administrators did not use rights language to mobilize rights-holders, to
demand resources from the state, or to press rights claims in court, as has been
the focus of an abundant “rights talk” literature. Rather, they used that
language as an administrative tool, a substitute for more formal mechanisms of
influencing the myriad administrative decisions occurring on the ground. That
is this Article’s primary claim.
This Article also advances a second, more theoretical claim: it offers the
practices of New Deal-era welfare administrators as an example of how rights
language could be useful to the regime of governance that scholars have come
to call the modern liberal state. With the distance of time, the character of this
regime is clear: it is one of centralized power, dominant national authority, and
expansive administrative capacities; it assumes both “positive” and “negative”
obligations toward state subjects.29 How that regime came to be—specifically,
how it overcame the forces opposing it—is less clear.30 This Article suggests
that attention to rights, often described as characteristic of the modern liberal
state,31 was also part of what made that state possible. Government-issued
rights language, trickling down from federal administrators to local welfare

28.

29.

30.

31.
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I do not contend that these differences are merely semantic. As I argue elsewhere, particular
administrators had good reasons for emphasizing one type of right over another. See infra
note 112. The important point, for the purpose of this Article, is that all these variations were
antithetical to the old poor law framework.
See William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT
LAW’S CENTURY 249, 264 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002). By
talking about the state in this way, I join those scholars who have jettisoned the quest to
determine whether the United States has an ideal-type state (and if so, when that state
developed) and instead examine changes in the complicated compound of institutions,
rules, discourses, and powers that, together, govern the equally complicated entity known as
“society.” See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (Margaret Weir,
Ann Shola Orloff & Theda Skocpol eds., 1988); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992);
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
See JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF BIG
GOVERNMENT 10 (2011) (“[W]e have little sense of how the extraordinary state-building of
the [mid-century] period was accomplished with so little opposition.”).
See, e.g., ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND
WAR 170 (1995) (identifying “a preoccupation with ‘rights’” as a defining feature of postWorld War II liberalism).

welfare and rights before the movement

workers, helped central-state authority expand into new domains.
Simultaneously, the language of federal welfare rights marked poor
individuals—still accustomed to thinking of themselves as state and local
subjects—as citizens of a beneficent nation-state (even if the federal
government was not yet prepared to defend those rights in the courts).
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an introduction to the
federally subsidized public assistance programs that the Social Security Act
created. These programs have been criticized, rightfully, for institutionalizing
an inferior “track” in a discriminatory “two-track” welfare state. According to
welfare state scholars, national-level insurance-based programs, such as oldage insurance and unemployment insurance, were designed to allow their
beneficiaries (white, male industrial workers and their dependents,
predominantly) to maintain a privileged status; the programs did this through
generous and regular payments and less stigmatizing administrative
procedures. Public assistance programs, by contrast, were based on an invasive
system of “means testing” and allowed meager, irregular payments. They
thereby signaled that their beneficiaries (disproportionately women and racial
minorities) deserved less.32 Without disputing that point, this Article
emphasizes the underappreciated ways in which New Deal public assistance
programs attempted to improve on existing efforts. These programs were a
progressive33 attempt to modernize poor relief by shifting responsibility for the

32.

33.

See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 4-5 (1994) (identifying social insurance with the highest
stratum of the welfare state and AFDC with the lowest); ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING
THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1998) (exposing how racial
divisions and anxieties shaped the institutional structure of several New Deal social welfare
policies); SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL
PUBLIC POLICY (1998) (identifying the gender biases embedded in New Deal social welfare
and labor policies); SKOCPOL, supra note 29 (chronicling the rise, and subsequent
marginalization, of mothers’ pensions); Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel
Welfare State: Workmen’s Compensation and Mothers’ Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND
WELFARE 123 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990) (using workmen’s compensation and mothers’
pensions to discuss the underpinnings of the “two-channel welfare state”).
I use “progressive” in the historical sense. In my view, the term conveys a set of beliefs that,
while never completely coherent or consistent, captivated middle-class and professional
Americans between the late nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. Outspoken
moralizing sometimes intersected with these beliefs, but the core was a deep faith in the
beneficence of expert knowledge, rational governance, and objective decisionmaking, and a
conviction that all social problems could be solved. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC
CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998); see also SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ
FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT,
1865-1901 (1956) (tracing the progressive movement back to a system of thought which
rejected the theory of laissez faire in favor of a theory of interventionist government,
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poor from the local level, which reformers associated with incompetence and
irrationality, to the state and federal levels.
Parts II and III draw on deep archival research to illustrate two aspects of
administrative law in action. Part II offers early glimpses of an administrative
discourse of welfare rights. It shows that, contrary to existing accounts of the
Social Security Act and its administration, concepts of rights were part of
federal administrators’ original understanding of the public assistance
program—and therefore part of their “tool kit” when a difficult administrative
problem emerged. That problem, the focus of Part III, was the endurance of
localism: dispatches from the field from the late 1930s and early 1940s made
clear that, despite the federal administrators’ efforts to redistribute power
inward (toward a central agency) and upward (toward the state level), local
administrators continued to run the show. Further, many local welfare workers
operated according to the norms of the old poor law, rather than the dictates of
“modern” public assistance administration.
Part IV recovers the indirect ways in which federal administrators tried to
communicate with local welfare workers. In these communications, the notion
of “right” was prominent, and was used as a point of contrast with the
“gratuities” given under the “antiquated” poor relief tradition. This
interpretation diverges significantly from those of the two scholars who have
noted rights language within New Deal public assistance administration.
William Simon’s revisionist (now classic) welfare rights article called attention
to the rights language in a number of federal public assistance documents from
the 1940s. But Simon’s interest was the value of this rights discourse as
“jurisprudence,” and specifically, as a lost alternative to the jurisprudence that
animated the welfare rights test cases of the late 1960s and 1970s. He was not
interested in questions about the nature or function of rights in the New Deal
administrative state.34 Historian Linda Gordon has cited some of this
administrative rights language but has characterized it as a convenient
rhetorical mask for the “needs talk” that she believes dominated social work,
differentiating members of that overwhelmingly female profession from the
predominantly male labor economists who joined them in crafting New Deal
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committed to solving social problems); SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL
OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 265 (Atheneum
1975) (1959) (associating the conservation movement, and progressivism more generally,
with scientific management and rational planning).
William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985).
Simon’s limited source base also led him to conclude that this rights language was
exclusively the province of government social workers. Id. at 3-4. In fact, lawyers were
deeply invested in the same language.
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social welfare policy.35 This Article, by contrast, looks closely at the audience
that federal administrators targeted when they sent rights language into the
world. The result is the novel concept of rights language as an administrative
tool.
Part V explores the significance of this finding for broader understandings
of the role of rights in the development and legitimization of America’s modern
liberal state. An abundant “rights talk” literature provides the starting point for
this journey, but not the ending point, for ultimately the rights language in this
Article does not evidence the hopes and beliefs of claimants so much as it
suggests the “benevolent imperialism”36 of national state-builders. Through
rights language, distributed through administrative channels, they attempted
to extend the jurisdiction of the nation-state and articulate new claims to local
citizens. The Conclusion reflects on the possible consequences of these efforts
and, finally, shifts the lens from rights articulators to rights deniers.
i. the social security act of 1935 : a new deal for poor relief
The Social Security Act of 1935, best known for initiating a national system
of old-age insurance, was in fact a major piece of welfare legislation, one that
attempted to alter significantly the landscape of public provision for the poor.
Until the Great Depression, poor relief was largely the responsibility of private
charity and local government, with each locality following its own course.
Some persons looked to a county-level agency for relief, while others turned to
a town or municipal unit; in some places, multiple public entities claimed
jurisdiction over the poor, while in others there was nothing more than a single
official to process charity cases. States played a limited role. On the eve of the
Depression, less than a third of states had experimented with poor relief, and
only eight had created state-level welfare departments to coordinate activities.37
A bird’s-eye view of American poor relief would have resembled a crazy quilt,
with a limited number of fabrics but “an amazing diversity of patterns.”38

35.
36.

37.
38.

Linda Gordon, Social Insurance and Public Assistance: The Influence of Gender in Welfare
Thought in the United States, 1890-1935, 97 AM. HIST. REV. 19, 33-35 (1992).
I borrow this term from David Miller, who has used it to describe a hypothetical system in
which one nation intervenes to protect the basic rights of the members of another nation.
DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 76-78 (1995).
MARIETTA STEVENSON, PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 9-13 (1938).
Fred K. Hoehler, Public Welfare Administration Under the Social Security Act, 3 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 279 (1936); see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 216-17 (rev. ed. 1996) (“a
confused, bewildering administrative pattern”). For a compilation of poor law materials
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The Depression changed everything. Local governments went broke as
their revenue sources dried up. Private agencies saw their caseloads rise and
their resources wane. Millions of Americans fell into poverty and grew restless.
Into that picture entered the federal government, first via the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which offered billions of dollars in
temporary aid to states to distribute to their needy citizens, and then through
the Social Security Act, which provided tens of millions of dollars per year to
states in matching funds. These funds were not for general use, however. They
were set aside for the relief of certain “unemployables”: the elderly (Old-Age
Assistance (OAA));39 the children of fatherless homes (Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC));40 and the blind (Aid to the Blind (AB)).41 Contemporaries
understood this scheme as President Roosevelt’s way of quitting “this business
of relief”42—by which he meant direct relief to all needy persons, regardless of
ability to work—while both assuaging demands for old-age pensions and
filling the gaps left by traditional purveyors of support.43
The Act’s public assistance titles bore the imprint of their drafters: the
labor economists, lawyers, public welfare administrators, and social workers
whom President Roosevelt called upon to bring the New Deal to this
historically local realm.44 Perhaps best understood as “sober” or “mild”

39.
40.
41.

42.

43.
44.
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from different states, dating from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, see 1 EDITH
ABBOTT, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1966).
Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, tit. I, § 1, 49 Stat. 620, 620.
Id. tit. IV, § 401, 49 Stat. at 627.
Id. tit. X, § 1001, 49 Stat. at 645. Other titles provided for old-age insurance (initially called
“federal old-age benefits”), maternal and child welfare, and public health work. Id. tit. II, 49
Stat. at 622; id. tit. V, 49 Stat. at 629; id. tit. VI, 49 Stat. at 634. For able-bodied men, the
Act included an unemployment insurance title. Id. tit. III, 49 Stat. at 626. The federal
government also continued to provide work relief through the Works Progress (later, Work
Projects) Administration. KATZ, supra note 38, at 236.
This oft-quoted (and misquoted) phrase is from President Roosevelt’s January 4, 1935,
message to Congress, in which he stated that “[t]o dole out relief in this way”—i.e., on an
emergency and undifferentiated basis—was “to administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of
the human spirit. It is inimical to the dictates of sound policy. It is in violation of the
traditions of America.” He demanded that work, not relief, be given to “able-bodied but
destitute workers.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 4,
1935), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14890.
ARTHUR J. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 16 (1966). On the
demands for old-age pensions, see infra note 87.
Labor economists on President Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security designed the
Old-Age Assistance (OAA) title, which in turn became the model for the lower-profile Aid
to the Blind (AB) title. Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) administrator
Harry Hopkins and members of his staff designed ADC, with input from the Children’s
Bureau and the upper echelons of the social work community. ROBYN MUNCY, CREATING A
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progressives,45 these professionals agreed that the object was not to improve
poor individuals or rouse community sympathy, as earlier crusaders had
attempted. Rather, it was to use federal legislation to convert the nation’s poor
relief operations—which reformers often described as “antiquated”46 and
“archaic”47—into a modern public welfare system. They planned to accomplish
this through centralization, bureaucratization, standardization, expert
leadership, and, of course, the power of the federal government’s purse.48
Political realities constrained the drafters. They quickly learned that
creating a national standard for benefit levels49 would incense influential
Southern Democrats and thereby threaten the Act’s adoption.50 While eager for
federal funds, Southern senators were anxious to protect their region’s racially
stratified socioeconomic structure. A national floor meant that local
administrators had no discretion; discretion was precisely what, historically,

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.
50.

FEMALE DOMINION IN AMERICAN REFORM, 1890-1935, at 151-52 (1994); EDWIN E. WITTE,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 3-61 (1962); Gordon, supra note 35, at 48;
Interview by Peter A. Corning with Arthur Altmeyer, in Madison, Wis. (June 29, 1967)
(transcript on file with Oral History Collection of Columbia University), http://www.ssa.gov
/history/ajaoral4.html.
DAVID CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM 68-69 (2006) (referring to
the “sober” aspects of the progressive agenda); JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE NEW DEAL AND
THE STATES: FEDERALISM IN TRANSITION 7 (1969) (referring to “mild progressives”); cf.
EDGAR KEMLER, THE DEFLATION OF AMERICAN IDEALS: AN ETHICAL GUIDE FOR NEW
DEALERS 101-30 (1941) (labeling these New Dealers as “deflated” progressives).
Edith Abbott, Abolish the Pauper Laws, 8 SOC. SERV. REV. 1, 10 (1934); Barbara Nachtrieb
Armstrong, The Nature and Purpose of Social Insurance, 170 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 1, 1 (1933); Ellen C. Potter & Blanche L. La Du, Co-ordination of State and Local Units for
Welfare Administration, 7 SOC. SERV. REV. 383, 393 (1933).
Arthur Dunham, Pennsylvania and Unemployment Relief, 1929-34, 8 SOC. SERV. REV. 246, 251
(1934); Frank W. Goodhue, Report of the Committee on Uniform Settlement Laws and the
Transfer of Dependents, 5 SOC. SERV. REV. 395, 397 (1931); Marietta Stevenson, Standards of
Public Aid, 70 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 57, 57 (1934).
See DERTHICK, supra note 1, at 18-19 (observing that their draft bill “intended to encourage
what the professionals thought was progressive in state assistance administration and to
suppress what they thought was not . . . to bring order out of the state and local chaos”).
This history supports Daniel Rodgers’s insight that “to a striking degree the New Deal
enlisted its ideas and agenda out of the progressive past.” RODGERS, supra note 33, at 415.
Copying from the Massachusetts and New York old-age assistance laws, they suggested “a
reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.” WITTE, supra note 44, at 144.
On the power of Southern Democrats in Congress during this period, see Ira Katznelson,
Kim Geiger & Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933-1950,
108 POL. SCI. Q. 283 (1993).
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had kept poor blacks working for low wages in fields and homes.51 The Act’s
drafters also had to abandon dreams of imposing federal standards on state
administrative personnel. Personnel selection was a particularly cherished state
prerogative,52 and recent intrusions in this area had left states with a sour
taste.53
But the drafters of the Social Security Act had no intention of allowing the
American system of poor relief to limp along familiar tracks, a point sometimes
lost amidst scholarly condemnations of its shortcomings. First, the Act locked
out private relief providers, such as the Red Cross, from distributing any part
of the new grants-in-aid.54 The drafters did not object to voluntary relief
efforts, but, embracing a tenet of the burgeoning field of public administration,
they believed that public employees, accountable to the public, should

51.

52.

53.

54.
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See BLANCHE D. COLL, SAFETY NET: WELFARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1929-1979, at 31-32
(1995); LIEBERMAN, supra note 32, at 48-56; WITTE, supra note 44, at 143-44. On other New
Deal policies that systematically disadvantaged African Americans, see Michael S. Holmes,
The New Deal and Georgia’s Black Youth, 38 J. S. HIST. 443 (1972); Melissa Walker, African
Americans and TVA Reservoir Property Removal: Race in a New Deal Program, 72 AGRIC. HIST.
417 (1998); and Adam Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal
Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and
Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186 (2005).
LANSDALE ET AL., supra note 1, at 273. The issue famously reared its head again in the Burger
Court’s decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which held that
the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating the wages, hours, and benefits
of state employees.
FERA required at least one professional social worker in every agency. These “pantry
snoopers” were widely disliked. See HAROLD P. LEVY, A STUDY IN PUBLIC RELATIONS: CASE
HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS MAINTAINED BETWEEN A DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
AND THE PEOPLE OF A STATE 29 (1943) (noting that in Pennsylvania the term “social worker”
was “anathema”); Wilma Van Dusseldorp, The In-Service Training of Public Welfare Workers,
17 SOC. FORCES 60, 61 (1938) (noting that in Georgia, social workers faced “such derogatory
terms as ‘pantry snooping,’ ‘nosing into peoples’ private affairs,’ ‘exerting excessive and
unwarranted control over lives of other people,’ etc.”); Interview by Jacqueline K. Parker
with Helen Valeska Bary, in S.F., Cal. (1973) (transcript on file with Regional Oral History
Office, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley), http://content.cdlib.org
/view?docId=kt6z09n8m9 (noting that the Governor of Colorado “thoroughly detested”
social workers).
The Act ultimately provided that although a federal agency had power to prescribe
“methods of administration,” that power excluded methods “relating to selection, tenure of
office, and compensation of personnel.” Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, tit. I,
§ 2(a)(5), 49 Stat. 620, 620; id. tit. IV, § 402(a)(5), 49 Stat. at 627; id. tit. X, § 1002(a)(5), 49
Stat. at 645.
Here the drafters followed a path blazed by the Children’s Bureau in its administration of
the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act, Pub. L. No. 67-97, 42 Stat. 224 (1921), see
MUNCY, supra note 44, at 108, 121, and further worn by FERA, see COLL, supra note 51, at 21-22.
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administer public funds.55 They also wanted states to recognize welfare as “an
important, respectable, large scale function of government.”56 (Most charities,
themselves crippled by the Depression, were in no position to object.57)
Second, the Act permitted federal funds to flow only to states that administered
public assistance through, or under the supervision of, a central-state organ.58
Administering public assistance from Washington, as was the plan with oldage insurance, was never really on the table, at least not after the federal
emergency relief experiment, in which FERA administrator Harry Hopkins
and his subordinates so dramatically alienated state and local officials.59 The
drafters’ goal was simply to amass authority at some kind of center, to
minimize the mischief and waste that they believed accompanied unbridled
local discretion.60 Third, the Act required that every state public assistance plan
apply uniformly across the state. For political and legal reasons, the Act’s
designers could not compel interstate uniformity, but they could address the
intrastate variability that had marked—and in their view, marred—previous

55.

56.

57.

58.
59.
60.

See COLL, supra note 51, at 21 (describing how public welfare reformers, in order to “assure
accountability to the taxpayers,” “preached the equation: public funds = public agency”);
JAMES LEIBY, A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 225
(1978) (documenting Harry Hopkins’s influential decision, as FERA administrator, that
public agencies alone spend federal funds).
Interview by James R.W. Leiby with Frank Bane, in Berkeley, Cal., 154-55 (Jan. 1965)
(transcript on file with Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley), http://ia600504.us.archive.org/21/items/pubadminpubwelfare00banerich
/pubadminpubwelfare00banerich.pdf.
See ANDREW J.F. MORRIS, THE LIMITS OF VOLUNTARISM: CHARITY AND WELFARE FROM THE
NEW DEAL THROUGH THE GREAT SOCIETY 3-34 (2009). Catholic charities were a partial
exception. See DOROTHY M. BROWN & ELIZABETH MCKEOWN, THE POOR BELONG TO US:
CATHOLIC CHARITIES AND AMERICAN WELFARE 152 (1997) (arguing that Catholic charities
managed to preserve an important role for themselves within the new public welfare
programs, but had to cede control of much of their terrain to public agencies).
Social Security Act tit. I, § 2(a)(3), tit. IV, § 402(a)(3), tit. X, § 1002(a)(3); COLL, supra note
51, at 68-69.
See PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 50-75 (chronicling the myriad conflicts between FERA
officials and state and local authorities).
See Hoehler, supra note 38, at 287 (explaining that the centralization requirement was about
providing “adequate supervision” and “maintain[ing]” “standards,” not directing the
program from above). The “single State agency” provision also had the effect of
disentangling the judiciary from localized webs of social welfare provision. For example,
juvenile courts in some jurisdictions had long administered mothers’ pensions, a vestige of
what political scientist Stephen Skowronek famously labeled a nineteenth-century “state of
courts and parties.” SKOWRONEK, supra note 29, at 39. The “single State agency” provision
suggested that when it came to federally subsidized public assistance programs,
administrative authority would have to reside elsewhere. STEVENSON, supra note 37, at 11516; R. CLYDE WHITE, ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WELFARE 51-52 (2d ed. 1950).
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relief efforts.61 Fourth, the Act required state plans to provide all aggrieved
applicants an opportunity for a “fair hearing” at the state level. This provision
was a check on the local officials making first-order decisions about whom to
aid. Some guarantee of review by an “objective” state administrator would
theoretically prevent irrational customs or outmoded attitudes about poverty
from dictating decisions about people in need.62
While these four conditions signaled to state and local governments that
power over poor relief must shift inward, toward one ultimate decisionmaker,
and upward, toward the state and federal governments, other conditions
demanded a break with old poor law traditions. For example, one provision
prohibited states from channeling their grants into the public institutions
(poorhouses, orphanages, asylums) that had become favored repositories for
the indigent.63 Another provision mandated that assistance be in cash rather
than in kind (clothes, grocery orders, etc.).64 A third provision undermined the
principle of “settlement,” under which towns, and later states, accepted
responsibility for those with an established attachment to the locality and
warned out others.65 Public assistance must “be administered on a much higher
plane than that of the old poor laws,” the drafters insisted.66
In sum, much remained the same—too much, from the perspective of some
reformers—and yet the Act initiated fundamental changes in public
responsibility for the poor. Before its enactment, most poor Americans
garnered only discretionary handouts, issued from local centers of power and
governed by local notions of desert. After the Act, if all went as planned, large
swaths of this population would receive regular, if not generous, payments,
still tied to local attitudes, but supervised by states and bounded by state and
federal law. Such modernizing reforms had already reached communication,
manufacturing, transportation, and health. Finally, they were coming to poor
relief.67
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63.
64.
65.

66.
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Social Security Act tit. I, § 2(a)(1), tit. IV, § 402(a)(1), tit. X, § 1002(a)(1).
Id. tit. I, § 2(a)(4), tit. IV, § 402(a)(4), tit. X, § 1002(a)(4). The administration of the fair
hearing provision is taken up in more detail in Tani, supra note 13, at 115-66.
Social Security Act tit. I, § 3(a)(1), tit. X, § 1003(a)(1).
Id. tit. I, § 6, tit. IV, § 406(b), tit. X, § 1006.
Id. tit. I, § 2(b)(2), tit. IV, § 402(a), tit. X, § 1002(b)(1) (prohibiting states from enforcing
residency standards that excluded a person who had spent five of the previous nine years
residing in a state).
COMM. ON ECON. SEC., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 45 (1935).
These reforms reflected an understanding of federalism that came to prominence only in the
Progressive Era. “[T]he idea,” historian Harry Scheiber has explained, was “that the
distribution of responsibilities between the national government and the states ought to be
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Congress created an independent agency, the Social Security Board (SSB),
to administer the Act and gave it both a carrot and a stick to use in its dealings
with the states. The carrot was money: the SSB had the power to give federal
funds to states that submitted appropriate public assistance plans.68 The
appropriation for the first year was relatively modest—$77.5 million—but this
figure grew steadily over subsequent years, and was nonetheless a boon to the
cash-strapped states.69 The stick was also money: the SSB had the right to
defund states that failed to adhere to federal requirements.70 In other words, it
was a scheme of monetary incentives, directed exclusively at the states. It was
also a prime example of what contemporary scholars have labeled “cooperative
federalism”: rather than regarding the national government and the states as
separate sovereigns (“dual federalism”), Edward Corwin has explained,
policymakers had started to treat them as “mutually complementary parts of a
single governmental mechanism.”71
Federal administrators trod carefully, wary of being accused of federal
overreaching as they attempted to guide states toward fundable public
assistance schemes. In fact, though, the SSB was operating from a position of
strength. Recognizing that the time-honored providers of relief were bankrupt
and that state coffers were next, state officials were eager to access federal funds
and willing to follow federal guidance.72 With a handful of exceptions, they

68.
69.

70.
71.

72.

based upon a pragmatic, realist standard as to congruence and appropriateness—rather than
being based upon immutable doctrines embodied in formal constitutional constructs.”
Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 427, 430 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 1996).
Social Security Act tits. I, IV, X.
On the swift increase in federal funding, see Division of Public Assistance Research, Bureau
of Research & Statistics, Sources of Funds Expended for the Special Types of Public Assistance in
1939, SOC. SECURITY BULL., July 1940, at 45, 45, which notes that in 1939, federal
expenditures for the three categorical assistance programs amounted to over $243 million.
Social Security Act tit. I, § 4, tit. IV, § 404, tit. X, § 1004.
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1950). The
foundational work on this “new federalism” is JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW
FEDERALISM: FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1938). On how
American federalism has evolved since the New Deal, see Martha Derthick, How Many
Communities? The Evolution of American Federalism, in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S
FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 125 (Martha Derthick ed., 1999); and Harry N. Scheiber, American
Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L.
REV 619, 649-76 (1978).
See Interview with Frank Bane, supra note 56, at 203 (recalling that states “clamor[ed]” for
guidance in the early years); Interview with Helen Valeska Bary, supra note 53, at 208
(recalling that governors, administrators, and lawyers “flock[ed] in” from “nearly all the
states” to learn how to apply). It is also true, as political scientist Kimberley Johnson has
observed, that by 1935, all parties were familiar with cooperative federalism and its
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built their plans on a federally approved foundation and adjusted them to SSB
specifications.73 States also operated their plans with federal requirements in
mind. Every quarter, each state looked to the SSB to confirm its expenditures
for the previous months and approve its projections for the next. At this point
the SSB could, and often did, take “audit exceptions,” refusing to reimburse
the state for payments not made in conformity with federal rules.74 These were
sharp reminders of federal authority. The SSB could also suspend entire grants
(audit exceptions involved just fractions), a power that the agency exercised
rarely but alluded to frequently.
The more formidable administrative problem, federal officials began to
suspect, was the lack of federal or state control over what happened at the local
level, where public assistance funds passed into the hands of the poor. Again,
the prevailing paradigm before the Depression was local dominance. In 1930,
the vast majority of expenditures for public aid—an estimated 91%—came
from local funds.75 That percentage diminished over time—from 82% in 1931,
to 24% in 1933, to between 9% and 11% in the last half of the decade—but in
dollar amounts, local contributions consistently surpassed 1930 levels.76
Further, irrespective of the source of the funds, distribution to the poor had
long been a matter of local discretion. In short, the federal and the state
governments were new players on a very old field. What’s more, the Social
Security Act’s pragmatic drafters let the old players keep playing: the new
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techniques. KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE: CONGRESS AND THE
NEW FEDERALISM, 1877-1929, at 163 (2007); accord DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF
FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON 76-91 (1995).
Within months of the Act’s adoption, the SSB had distributed instructions and convened a
conference in Washington to explain to states how to prepare their plans. The SSB’s main
private-sector ally, the American Public Welfare Association (APWA), also drafted and
circulated Board-approved model bills. See COLL, supra note 51, at 69; Interview with Helen
Valeska Bary, supra note 53, at 210-11. In at least one instance, a state secured even more
tailored assistance: after a Board emissary told the Governor of Colorado that the SSB
intended to reject his state’s plans, he ordered her to sit down with the state’s deputy
attorney general and legislative reference counsel, “write laws that she did like,” and have
them on the desks of state legislators the following morning. Interview with Helen Valeska
Bary, supra note 53, at 231-37; see JOSEPHINE CHAPIN BROWN, PUBLIC RELIEF, 1929-1939, at
408 (1940); COLL, supra note 51, at 76.
Mark P. Hale, The Federal Role in Public Assistance 208-10 (June 1956) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the University of Chicago).
BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE, FED. SEC. AGENCY, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REPORT NO. 4, PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE 1941, at 21 (1941). Public aid here includes both work relief and subsistence
grants. Id.
Id. at 21-22; see William Haber, Problems of State Administration, 1937 PROC. NAT’L CONF.
SOC. WORK 445.
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federal-state public assistance programs sat atop, rather than supplanted, the
diffuse collection of local agencies and officials that had been tending to the
poor.77
The Act did require state oversight—a departure from the past—but in fact
states could choose between administering the public assistance plan and
merely supervising. Most states chose the latter, meaning that administration
remained largely a local matter.78 The result was “decentralized centralization,”
to borrow the apt characterization of one state welfare director,79 an
arrangement that fulfilled federal goals only if state centers had the ability to
exert meaningful control over actors on their peripheries. Federal
administrators soon had reason to doubt whether such control existed—and
had no formal mechanism for addressing the problem.80 They would respond
by attempting to influence the local level informally and indirectly, including
through the language of rights.
ii. security through rights
President Roosevelt’s eloquent declarations of social and economic rights
are a hallmark of the New Deal era. Historians agree, however, that his
Administration took a more cautious position on support payments to the
poor.81 Prevailing accounts of those payment programs emphasize the Social
Security Board’s repeated declarations that whereas social insurance benefits
were the right of those who qualified, public assistance payments were
something less; like traditional poor relief, they were given as a pittance, and
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For a detailed account of the administration of the Social Security Act, focusing especially on
the organization and operation of the Social Security Board, see CHARLES MCKINLEY &
ROBERT W. FRASE, LAUNCHING SOCIAL SECURITY: A CAPTURE-AND-RECORD ACCOUNT, 19351937 (1970).
STEVENSON, supra note 37, at 90.
David C. Adie, Responsibility of the State in the Supervision of Public Welfare Programs, 13 SOC.
SERV. REV. 611, 618 (1939).
While their enforcement machinery established clear links between the federal agency and
the states, it presumed no relationship between the federal and the local. The best that the
SSB could do was use its carrot and stick to persuade the state governments to create the
sort of machinery that could bring local units into line. See COLL, supra note 51, at 68-69.
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 201 (1998) (noting that President
Roosevelt initially attempted to meet the challenges of the Depression through economic
reform and emergency relief; only later did he turn to permanent programs of income
support); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 19321940, at 124 (1963) (documenting President Roosevelt’s reluctance to provide direct support
payments, at least to employable persons, and his clear preference for work relief).
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only upon a humiliating confession of dependency on the state.82 The reality
was more complicated: even as top administrators sold social insurance as an
“earned right” and by implication denigrated public assistance, mid-level
administrators and their professional colleagues just outside the agency
developed a competing discourse. Concepts of rights, far from being off-limits,
were integral to their understandings of New Deal public assistance.
A. An “Earned Right”: Social Insurance
The preceding Part, detailing the reformist goals underlying the drafting of
the Social Security Act, emphasized the Act’s public assistance titles. In
practice, federal administrators rarely thought about assistance—old-age
assistance (OAA), in particular—without contemplating possible repercussions
for old-age insurance. In the months following enactment, the Social Security
Board took great pains to sell the public on the latter, and specifically to explain
why some form of “pension,” disconnected from prior earnings, was not as
good. Yes, the Social Security Act included a public assistance component,
Board Chair John Winant explained to the readers of the Atlantic Monthly in
1936, but public assistance benefits “are based upon the need of the recipient,”
whereas old-age insurance benefits “are available to an eligible individual as a
matter of right.”83 The SSB took the same message on the road. “The benefits
paid under the federal old-age insurance system will be paid as a matter of right
irrespective of need,” read one of Board member Arthur Altmeyer’s typical
speeches, while OAA payments would depend on “proven need”—i.e., continual
means testing by a government worker.84 These comments reflect a deep fear
and a strategic choice: the SSB initially refused to refer to public assistance
payments as a right because it recognized the appeal of OAA and did not want
Americans’ enthusiasm for that program to prevent them from developing the
proper affection for Old-Age Insurance, OAA’s pointy-headed cousin.
This fear was well founded. Since the 1910s, support for government-
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JERRY R. CATES, INSURING INEQUALITY: ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP IN SOCIAL SECURITY,
1935-54, at 26-31 (1983); GORDON, supra note 32, at 5; MOLLY C. MICHELMORE, TAX AND
SPEND: THE WELFARE STATE, TAX POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 13
(2012); JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1980, at 76
(1981); Alice Kessler-Harris, In the Nation’s Image: The Gendered Limits of Social Citizenship
in the Depression Era, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1251, 1263-65 (1999).
John G. Winant, An Approach to Social Security, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1936,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1936/07/an-approach-to-social-security/4020.
Arthur Altmeyer, Speech to the Annual Meeting of National Conferences of Catholic
Charities (1938), quoted in CATES, supra note 82, at 30.
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funded old-age pensions had been on the rise. Dedicated campaigning by the
Fraternal Order of the Eagles and organized labor produced old-age pension
schemes in seventeen states by 1932.85 Several years of Depression living
increased that count. Older workers who had lost their jobs discovered that,
owing to age discrimination, their plight was rarely temporary; adult children
faced their own economic woes and were unable to support their parents.
Around the nation, people banded together in pension associations and
annuity leagues, prompting eleven more states to enact old-age pension plans
over the next two years.86 Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Americans
supported proposals for a national plan, such as Dr. Francis Townsend’s call
for $200 a month for every citizen over age sixty87 and Senator Huey Long’s
alluring plan for the country to “share our wealth.”88 By one federal
government estimate from 1935, one million elderly citizens were in urgent
need and many more were barely better off.89
The drafters of the Social Security Act presented Old-Age Insurance (now
known simply as “Social Security”)90 as the answer to the problem. In their
view, the need-based OAA program existed solely to meet interim needs—
insurance benefits were not scheduled to pay out until 1942—and to provide a
modicum of security to the elderly whom the insurance-based program
excluded (such as domestic and agricultural workers and the self-employed).
From most other vantage points, however, the assistance program was the
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JILL QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS AND POLITICS IN THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 66-72 (1988).
EDWIN AMENTA, BOLD RELIEF: INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 70 (1998) (reporting twenty-eight states with old-age pension
laws on the books by the end of 1934).
See generally EDWIN AMENTA, WHEN MOVEMENTS MATTER: THE TOWNSEND PLAN AND THE
RISE OF SOCIAL SECURITY (2006) (describing the advocates of Townsend’s governmentfunded pension plan as a highly influential social movement); QUADAGNO, supra note 85
(tracking support for old-age pensions from the late nineteenth century through the postWorld War II period).
ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST: HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN, AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 72-74 (1982) (describing Long’s mass appeal and his call for wealth
redistribution).
See COMM. ON ECON. SEC., supra note 66, at 24 (finding more than one million elderly
citizens receiving public charity).
The precise name during the period 1935 to 1939 was “Federal Old-Age Benefits,” but in
1937, “Old-Age Insurance” became federal administrators’ moniker of choice. CATES, supra
note 82, at 32-33. The program officially became “Old-Age and Survivors Insurance” in
September 1939, when Congress extended benefits to dependents and survivors of covered
earners. COLL, supra note 51, at 94; FED. SEC. AGENCY, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD 1939, H.R. DOC. NO. 76-610, at 18 n.1 (3d Sess. 1940).
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main event and the insurance program the experimental sideshow. Congress
focused more on assistance than insurance. The broader public did as well.
Those Americans who were aware of the insurance program tended to dismiss
it as “the self-interested work of experts,”91 or view it as part of a general
“pension” program for the elderly poor.92 Meanwhile, enthusiasm for OAA
soared. For example, thousands of prospective recipients converged on
Missouri’s old-age pension boards—1,500 in St. Louis alone—on the day the
state’s enabling legislation went into effect.93 Enthusiasm for a still more
generous Townsend-type alternative was even greater. Less than a month after
President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act into law, a group called the
Old Age Pension Association, claiming fifteen to twenty million members,
asked Congress to provide $5.5 billion per year for $30-per-month old-age
pensions.94 Around the same time, thousands of delegates from local
Townsend Clubs—which urged even larger pensions—descended on Chicago
for their first national convention.95
With conservative critics gnashing their teeth and competitors scratching at
the door, the executives atop the Social Security Board dedicated themselves to
establishing a loyal constituency for the insurance program. They embraced
rights rhetoric. Thus, at a 1936 Board viewing of the script for a short public
relations film, one Board member urged the scriptwriter to use the concept of
rights to draw a sharper distinction between the recipients of Old-Age
Insurance and those of OAA, and, further, to make the “insured” citizens
clearly better off: “Show the superior advantages of this spinster lady and selfrespecting man getting checks as a matter of right, which perhaps will enable
them to go to the seashore or have a hunting lodge, or something like that,” he
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BERKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 37; see also id. at 29-37 (describing general views of
unemployment compensation programs).
In February 1937, the executive director of the President’s Committee on Economic Security
reported disapprovingly that “[p]opularly . . . old age assistance is called ‘old age pensions,’
and there is a widespread notion that everyone who reaches a specified age is entitled to a
pension and a still more prevalent notion that all eligible persons should receive the same
grants.” Edwin E. Witte, Old Age Security in the Social Security Act, 45 J. POL. ECON. 1, 10
(1937). For an example of confused media coverage, see How Security Bill Aids Aged and Idle,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1935, at 4.
Louis LaCoss, Missourians Rush for Old-Age Grant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1935, at E7.
Associated Press, Urges Big Pension Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1935, at 32.
2,000 Townsend Aides Assemble in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1935, at 22. Thousands more
waited back home. Townsend once calculated that his organization had more members
nationwide than voted for Hoover in 1932. Politicians Worry over Townsendism, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1935, at N10. The movement claimed 750,000 dues-paying members in California
alone. George P. West, Townsend’s Plan Widely Supported, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1935, at E7.
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reportedly said. “Emphasize that it is not necessary for them to be ‘down and
out’ in order to get this fixed income.”96 Rights here operated in the same way
as the image of the luxury getaway: they distinguished a “superior” program
and clientele from an inferior one. The SSB hoped to convey that, under the
rights-based program, the state asked no questions and thereby left the
recipient’s self-respect intact, while under the need-based program, the state
demanded a demeaning display of destitution. For the same reason, the SSB
encouraged states to limit OAA to the truly needy (by applying rigorous means
testing) and discouraged them from promising grants that were more liberal
than the federal government had anticipated. “Obviously,” one staff member
explained in 1939, “if liberal old-age assistance payments are to be made to all
persons reaching 65, contributory old-age insurance becomes futile.”97
B. From Need to Right: Rights Language in Public Assistance Administration
The Social Security Board’s usage of rights language to differentiate the
insurance population from the assistance population is by now well known.
Less acknowledged is the fact that Arthur Altmeyer and his co-appointees at
the top of the agency represented just one site of power in a social welfare
bureaucracy that had several. Although the three-member Board made all
major tactical decisions, it relied heavily on support staff at the “mezzo level,”
Daniel Carpenter’s term for the monitors, planners, and managers operating
just below an agency’s executive positions.98 This was especially true in regard
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CATES, supra note 82, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board member was
Arthur Altmeyer.
Alvin Roseman, Old-Age Assistance, 202 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 58 (1939).
DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 19-21 (2001).
Carpenter makes a strong case for the power of mezzo-level actors during the period he
studies. Most important was their durability (they were not flushed out of office with every
change in presidential leadership). This, in turn, allowed for stable relations with Congress,
party elites, professions, and other organized interests. Stable relations enhanced the
likelihood that these actors would have the ability to innovate. Id. The Social Security Board
postdates Carpenter’s period, but many of its mezzo-level actors share the same
characteristics. Bureau of Public Assistance Director Jane Hoey remained in place until 1953;
opponents were able to extract her only by reclassifying her career civil service position as a
political one. Hoey’s right-hand woman, Kathryn D. Goodwin, worked for the Agency from
around 1940 until 1962, eventually assuming Hoey’s position. (On the precise date of
Goodwin’s start, see Kathryn D. Goodwin Dies; Headed Family Service Unit, WASH. POST,
Feb. 19, 1968, at B10. But see Beauty Beaten Senseless and Robbed of $25, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
1938, at 1 (suggesting that she started consulting for the agency as early as 1938).) In the
Agency’s Office of the General Counsel, lead lawyer Tom Eliot quickly moved on, but Jack
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to public assistance, a policy area that none of the Board members knew
particularly well.99 Before reaching the Board, most public assistance matters
went through (1) the Bureau of Public Assistance (BPA), headed by the warm
but formidable social worker Jane Hoey; and (2) the Office of the General
Counsel (GC), which—consistent with other accounts of New Deal
agencies100—loudly and persistently voiced its views.101 This devolution and
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Tate occupied the top spot from 1937 to 1939 and again from 1940 to 1947. Assistant General
Counsel A. Delafield Smith stayed put for seventeen years. Lawyer Bernice Bernstein
remained with the Agency from 1935 to 1977, with the exception of brief periods spent
caring for her children or doing wartime work for other federal agencies. The list goes on. In
any case, the point is not that these administrators enjoyed the precise level of autonomy
that Carpenter famously found; it is that their expertise and their relative insulation from
political pressures, combined with the sheer magnitude of the task at hand, allowed them to
advance their own interpretations of the Social Security Act and pursue their own strategies
for achieving the Act’s goals.
John Gilbert Winant, the Board’s first chair, governed New Hampshire for three terms and
had strong progressive credentials, but was no public welfare aficionado. Contemporaries
remembered him as kind and intelligent, but not “particularly informed about the problems
of social security.” Interview with Helen Valeska Bary, supra note 53, at 206. The earnest and
brilliant Arthur Altmeyer, who had headed Wisconsin’s Department of Industrial Relations
and had come to Washington to serve as Assistant Secretary of Labor, was first and
foremost a labor economist. He devoted most of his attention to the Act’s insurance-based
programs, which he believed would one day swallow up most public assistance recipients in
their benevolent embrace. Vincent Miles, a former Democratic Party official from Arkansas,
had come to the Board on the recommendation of the Senate Majority Leader. Himself a
political appointee, he took a greater interest in filling Old-Age Insurance (OAI) posts with
members of the American Legion than in making policy. Interview by Peter A. Corning with
Albert Henry Aronson, former Dir. of Pers., Soc. Sec. Bd., in Washington, D.C. 8-11, 90-91,
99-100 (Feb. 18, 1965) (transcript on file with Oral History Collection of Columbia
University); Interview with Helen Valeska Bary, supra note 53, at 206-07. (To the Roosevelt
Administration’s credit, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins asked Grace Abbott, one of the
nation’s preeminent social workers, to serve on the Board, but she declined. LELA B. COSTIN,
TWO SISTERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF GRACE AND EDITH ABBOTT 226 (1983).)
Jerold Auerbach famously characterized the New Deal as “a lawyers’ deal” because
“[l]awyers’ skills—drafting, negotiation, compromise—and lawyers’ values—process
divorced from substance—permitted its achievements, yet set its boundaries.” Jerold S.
Auerbach, Lawyers Who Govern, 1 REVS. AM. HIST. 146, 148 (1973); see also PETER H. IRONS,
THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982) (arguing for lawyers’ importance to the National Recovery
Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and the National Labor
Relations Board). A related body of scholarship has noted how heavily the New Deal relied
not simply on lawyers, but also on law and legal discourse. See, e.g., RONEN SHAMIR,
MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995); CHRISTOPHER L.
TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 154-60 (1985).
By making the case for lawyers’ power within the SSB, I do not mean to imply that the
lawyers there were as important as they were in, for example, the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, the National Recovery Administration, or the National Labor Relations

welfare and rights before the movement

diffusion of power created space for interpretations of the public assistance
program that differed from the Board’s. One point of divergence was the
program’s relationship to the concept of rights: while Board members all but
refused to use “public assistance” and “right” in the same sentence,102
administrators at the mezzo level embraced rights language as they gave form
and substance to the new program.
Figure 1.
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Within the upper echelons of professional social work, from which the BPA
drew most of its staff members, the language of rights was familiar. Those
coming from the Catholic Charities tradition, such as director Jane Hoey,
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Board. The variability of lawyerly dominance across the New Deal is a topic that merits
greater study. I also do not intend to generalize about the “New Deal lawyer.” As Michele
Landis Dauber has observed, for every high-flying Frankfurter protégé there were hundreds
of “older, more anonymous government lawyers” who “treated representing the New Deal
as ordinary legal work.” Michele Landis Dauber, New Deal Lawyers, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 399, 401 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2009); see
also Karen M. Tani, Portia’s Deal, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549 (2012) (spotlighting the careers
of three important but lower-profile women lawyers of the New Deal).
“I felt that a great number of hostile critics were just waiting, ready to pounce if the board
made a single mistake,” recalled Thomas Eliot, a Labor Department lawyer who helped draft
the Act and who became the first GC. It was Eliot’s “duty to keep the board on the straight
and narrow path.” THOMAS H. ELIOT, RECOLLECTIONS OF THE NEW DEAL: WHEN THE
PEOPLE MATTERED 126-27 (1992). Eliot and his assistant attorneys insisted on participating
in all Board meetings, which, according to one attendee, the Board “didn’t entirely like.”
Interview with Jack B. Tate, supra note 1, at 6-7.
Altmeyer would later change his tune. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
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imbibed the teaching that a minimum subsistence was man’s natural right; the
individual in need thus had a legitimate claim to the wealth of those around
him.103 Further, Catholic reformers worked hard to enshrine this ethical
obligation in positive law: the influential teacher and clergyman John A. Ryan,
for example, campaigned for wage and hour legislation, unemployment
insurance, protection for labor organizing, and provision against accident,
illness, and old age.104 Hoey, Ryan’s former pupil, showed her roots when she
declared man’s “right to these essentials which arise out of his intrinsic nature”
and government’s “obligation to see that essential human needs are met and
that the rights of the individual are protected.”105
Not everyone involved in relief giving felt this way—some vigorously
resisted social welfare legislation on the very ground that it would turn charity
into right106—but by the mid-1930s, the professional social workers with the
closest relationship to the New Deal could be heard using the language of
rights to describe the most enlightened and desirable social policy. For
example, as policymakers puzzled over how to approach the relief problem in
the years leading up to the Social Security Act, the American Association of
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See, e.g., WILLIAM J. KERBY, THE SOCIAL MISSION OF CHARITY: A STUDY OF POINTS OF VIEW
IN CATHOLIC CHARITIES (1921); Henry E. Manning, A Note on Outdoor Relief, 43 FORT. REV.
153 (1888).
See, e.g., JOHN A. RYAN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: THE RIGHT AND WRONG OF OUR PRESENT
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1916); JOHN A. RYAN, A LIVING WAGE: ITS ETHICAL AND
ECONOMIC ASPECTS (1906); JOHN A. RYAN, A PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION
(1909). Hoey trained under Monsignors Ryan and Kerby at Trinity College in Washington,
and their teachings are evident in her speeches and writings. For more on Catholic-socialwork and Catholic-welfare thought in this period in U.S. history, see BROWN & MCKEOWN,
supra note 57, at 51-85.
Jane M. Hoey, Social Work Concepts and Methods in the Postwar World, 71 PROC. NAT’L CONF.
SOC. WORK 35, 36-37 (1944). This quotation suggests a way in which a natural rights
framework could survive comfortably within an agency (and a larger Administration) that
embraced legal positivism. Catholic social worker and high-ranking Bureau of Public
Assistance (BPA) administrator Rose McHugh made similar statements. See BROWN &
MCKEOWN, supra note 57, at 179 (describing a 1939 presentation in which McHugh cited
with approval both the Catholic teaching of the right to subsistence and the Social Security
Act’s legal guarantees).
See, e.g., Report on Outdoor Relief, 1877 PROC. NAT’L CONF. CHARITIES 46, 48-49, 51 (decrying
“the pernicious notion that the State is bound to support all who demand assistance”
because such a notion leads the recipient of relief “to accept it without gratitude,” “use it
without discretion,” and eventually “demand[] [it] defiantly as a right”), quoted in JUNE
HOPKINS, HARRY HOPKINS: SUDDEN HERO, BRASH REFORMER 94 (1999); see also SKOCPOL,
supra note 29, at 426 (describing charity officials’ fears that mothers’ pensions, like Civil
War veterans’ pensions, would be construed as public obligations and result in ever-larger
expenditures).
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Social Workers Division on Government and Social Work advocated a national
program under which “assistance shall be accorded . . . as a right,” a right
protected by process (It “may eventually be claimed in a court of appeal.”) and
exercised freely (It “shall not result in any loss of civil or political rights.”).107
Similarly, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s influential relief czar, used rights
language to explain why state-level widows’ pensions represented an
“enlightened” model of caring for poor families: “Widows’ pensions in most
states took on the character of a ‘right,’” he opined in 1935; as a result, they
gave the recipients “a type of security” and “an independence in the
community” that they would not have enjoyed from traditional poor relief or
private charity.108 This was American social policy at its best.
Influential professional social workers also used, as negative referent,
programs and program administrators that failed to provide relief as a matter
of right. For example, William H. Matthews, Harry Hopkins’s former
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Memorandum from Hertha Kraus to the Comm. To Outline a Nat’l Soc. Welfare Program,
Am. Ass’n of Soc. Workers, Discussion of Social Welfare Programs in the Federal, State, and
Local Governments 2 (Nov. 23, 1934) (on file with University of Minnesota, Elmer E.
Andersen Library, Social Welfare History Archives, National Association of Social Workers
Records, 15/201). Kraus, an early advisor to the Social Security Board, hailed from Germany,
where government income support arguably had wider acceptance. Beate Bussiek, Hertha
Kraus: Quaker Spirit and Competence: Impulses for Professional Social Work in Germany and the
United States, in HISTORY OF SOCIAL WORK IN EUROPE (1900-1960): FEMALE PIONEERS AND
THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 53, 53,
59 (Sabine Hering & Berteke Waaldijk eds., 2003). There is evidence of similar statements,
however, from American-born social workers. For example, writing for the same American
Association of Social Workers division the following year, Joanna Colcord urged that the
Association “hold [as] self-evident that whenever a citizen is genuinely unable to provide for
his own subsistence and that of his dependents through his own efforts, he has a right to
look for it to government.” Joanna C. Colcord, Chairman, Comm. on Current Relief
Program, Div. on Gov’t & Soc. Work, The Responsibility of Government for Relief 1 (May
1935) (on file with University of Minnesota, Elmer E. Andersen Library, Social Welfare
History Archives, National Association of Social Workers Records, 1/19/210); see also Div.
on Gov’t & Soc. Work, Outline for a Federal Assistance Program, in AM. ASS’N OF SOC.
WORKERS, THIS BUSINESS OF RELIEF 162, 164 (1936) (“When there is no job and when
resources are gone, relief is a right to be availed of without hesitation or bad conscience.”).
HOPKINS, supra note 106, at 196 (quoting a manuscript written for Collier’s). Historians of
mothers’ pensions would disagree with the factual content of Hopkins’s statement—most
states did not treat these benefits as “rights.” See SKOCPOL, supra note 29, at 465-79 (finding
that in practice, recipients of progressive-era mothers’ pensions were subject to behavioral
restrictions, discrimination, and uneven, often inadequate grants); SUSAN M. STERETT,
PUBLIC PENSIONS: GENDER & CIVIC SERVICE IN THE STATES, 1850-1937, at 124-26 (2003)
(describing women’s failure to convince courts that state mothers’ pensions programs
created legal entitlements). Nonetheless, the quotation exemplifies how positively federal
government social workers viewed social welfare policies that treated recipients as rightsholders.
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colleague at the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, loudly
criticized the existing poor relief system for “br[ea]k[ing] the spirits of
people,” by making them beg for the assistance that “they had a right to ask
for” and “should have received at once.”109 Similarly, New York School of
Social Work professor (Amy) Gordon Hamilton used rights language to
redirect wayward relief caseworkers: each client had “a right . . . to relief if he
needs it,” she cautioned, as well as “a right to handle his own problems” if he
so chose.110 Such statements111 show that social workers in and around the
Roosevelt Administration relied on rights language—certainly not exclusively,
but substantially. Far from rejecting the pairing of welfare and rights, they
used rights language to talk about the extent of society’s obligation to the poor,
the desired contours of legislation, and the best practices of those tasked with
carrying out the law.
Rights language also proved important to the lawyers hired to advise the
Social Security Board on public assistance matters.112 One of the first tasks that
the Board gave its Office of the General Counsel was to explain a provision in
the Social Security Act that no one seemed to know much about, and hence no
one knew how to interpret to the states: the requirement that all state public
assistance plans guarantee applicants “an opportunity for a fair hearing.”113 The
Act’s drafters seem to have envisioned an appeal process that would both
defuse applicant dissent and encourage objective, uniform decisionmaking.114
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‘Respectable’ Base for Relief Urged, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1935, at 6.
Gordon Hamilton, Case-Work Responsibility in the Unemployment Relief Agency, 1934 PROC.
NAT’L CONF. SOC. WORK 393, 393.
Both examples in this paragraph come from New York social workers, which would seem to
limit the power of this evidence. It is relevant to note, however, that those tasked with
designing and implementing the New Deal relief programs often came directly from New
York-based charities, agencies, and schools. WILLIAM W. BREMER, DEPRESSION WINTERS:
NEW YORK SOCIAL WORKERS AND THE NEW DEAL 126-41 (1984).
This Article emphasizes the themes cutting across administrators’ rights language. On the
significant differences between the “rights talk” of agency social workers and that of
lawyers, see Tani, supra note 13, at 135-47.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See BROWN, supra note 73, at 373 (claiming that “the widespread practice of hearing
complaints and petitions of organized and unorganized groups of relief clients and project
workers in the offices of the Federal Emergency Relief and Works Programs” set “informal
precedents” for the fair hearing requirement); Jules H. Berman, The Administration of the
Appeal Provisions of the Public Assistance Legislation Enacted Under the Social Security Act
in Illinois and Certain Other States 1 (1937) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Chicago School of Social Service Administration) (on file with University of Chicago
Library) (speculating that the Framers thought the provision would protect recipients
against arbitrary and unfair decisionmaking).
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However, they provided little formal guidance, and the provision attracted no
attention during congressional review. In 1935, several members of the SSB’s
growing legal staff were tasked with identifying the bounds of interpretive
possibility, and, in the process, began considering the character of the public
benefits involved.
Staff attorney Emmett Delaney took the first crack, reporting to GC Tom
Eliot that the term “fair hearing” was closely associated with judicial process
and the related notion of “due process.”115 Due process, in turn, seemed to
depend on the right that was at stake. (Before giving content to the “term[s]
‘fair hearing’ and ‘opportunity to be heard,’” Delaney explained, one must
decide “what right is involved in the hearing under consideration.”116) In fact,
Delaney was unsure how a court would categorize payments under the Act and
seemed uncomfortable with the terms he knew. He pondered the distinction
between “public right” and “private right”; he toyed with the phrase “gift by
the government”; and he analogized the public assistance payment to the grant
of a professional license117 (as Charles Reich would do, to different effect,
nearly thirty years later118).
Delaney’s thought process owed something to the “loose[]” ways in which
lawyers and judges in the first decades of the twentieth century talked about
rights, privileges, powers, and liberties,119 but it also reflected a larger
confusion. At that moment, a jurisprudence based on individual rights to
contract and to property—the jurisprudence that has since borne the name of
the infamous Lochner decision120—was falling out of fashion, and its
replacement was not yet clear.121 Finding his law school textbooks outdated and
Supreme Court decisions muddled, Delaney apparently thought it best to
assume that individual rights of some sort were at stake. He then outlined the
procedures that seemed to offer adequate protection: these were not necessarily
coextensive with “judicial process,” but included notice, a full opportunity to
present facts, an impartial tribunal, and application of established rules rather
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Memorandum from Emmett P. Delaney to T.H. Eliot, An Opportunity for a Fair Hearing
4-5 (Oct. 23, 1935) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/10/G—Fair Hearing
(1935-1938)).
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 3, 8.
See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See RISA LAUREN GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 16-24 (2007).
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than mere discretion.122 Attorney Sue White offered Eliot a similar opinion
three weeks later. Although “b[earing] in mind that the aids . . . are gratuities
from the State,” she found that “so long as the funds exist and the laws of a
State provide for payments to qualified individuals,” such individuals “have a
right” to those payments. “[T]o avail themselves” of that right, she continued,
“they may invoke ‘due process of law.’”123
The lawyers grew increasingly attached to the fair hearing provision over
the following months, and increasingly confident about the rights beneath its
surface. In the spring of 1936, when the Board considered recommending that
Congress scratch the requirement (some states had complained, and the Board
had no strong sympathy for legalism), Assistant General Counsel Jack Tate
informed his superiors that an opportunity for a fair hearing was “a
constitutional requirement” and could not be legislated away.124 So long as the
Act remained in force, Tate explained, its beneficiaries had “vested rights” in
the benefits provided; vested rights, in turn, entitled beneficiaries to “due
process.”125 In reality, the legal picture was much muddier. Just six months
earlier, staff attorney Delaney’s diligent research had suggested that some sort
of process was required, but that the legal status of the underlying benefits was
open to speculation. Attorney White, who had called the benefits “gratuities”
and “right[s],” took a similar position.126 With the distance of time, it is also
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Memorandum from Emmett P. Delaney, supra note 115, at 2-6.
Like Delaney, White found that due process in this context did not mean “strict adherence”
to the rules that would apply in court, but did likely include adequate notice and the
opportunity to present and refute evidence. Memorandum from Sue S. White, Attorney, to
T.H. Eliot, Gen. Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., Brief on “FAIR HEARING” 1 (Oct. 14, 1935) (on
file with NARA II, SSB Records, 47/236/632.52).
Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., to Soc. Sec. Bd.,
Opportunity for a Fair Hearing 1 (Apr. 27, 1936) (on file with NARA II, SSB Records,
47/96/632.2); see Tani, supra note 13, at 45-46.
Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, supra note 124, at 1.
Memorandum from Sue S. White, supra note 123, at 1. Tellingly, the lawyers were just as
unsure about the legal status of OAI benefits—the ones that the Board had championed as
rights. In May 1936, in response to a query about the legal remedies available to OAI
claimants, lawyer Edward J. Rourke wrote to his colleague Leonard C. Calhoun that he did
not know how to characterize OAI benefits. As “rights”? As “gratuities”? As a “vested
right”? Or a “contract right”? Memorandum from Edward J. Rourke to Leonard C.
Calhoun, The Nature of, and Legal Remedies Available to an Individual To Obtain Benefits
Provided by Title II, Sections 202, 203, 204 and 205 of the Social Security Act 2 (May 27,
1936) (on file with the NARA II, HEW Records, 235/2/OAB—Benefits). He chose to draw
“[n]o legal conclusion . . . from the many references” to rights that attended the enactment
of the law, “as it seems clear that this word was used in a non-technical sense.” Id. at 14. He
also found no “competent decisions” from any court on the question. Id. at 48. Ultimately,
he suggested “that as to benefits that have been certified for payment at a date already
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clear that the debate was far from resolved. Two years later, attorneys in Tate’s
office would be trading memos about “the character and nature of the relief
given under the public assistance laws”; ten years later, the GC would be
arguing the point with the states; and not for decades would the courts lend
firm support to Tate’s position (some might question whether they ever
did).127 Yet in his memo to the Board, Tate’s tone was assertive and insistent:
rights were on the line.
It is unclear why Tate, who came to the Agency from the National
Recovery Administration and was considered a more “flexible” representative
of his profession,128 stood so firm. Perhaps he was protecting the Social
Security Act,129 perhaps his Agency,130 perhaps his profession.131 Perhaps he
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128.
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expired,” the claimant had an “interest . . . such that subsequent legislation cannot
constitutionally destroy or substantially impair it.” Id. He admitted, however, that his
conclusion was “little more than a guess.” Id. The Supreme Court would not weigh in on
the issue until 1960, when it ruled that accrued Social Security benefits were neither
property nor contract, but some sort of “noncontractual governmental benefit.” Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
Memorandum from Robert Johnston to A. Delafield Smith, The Character and Nature of
the Relief Given under the Public Assistance Laws (Mar. 28, 1938) (on file with NARA II,
HEW Records, 235/8/PA—Administration (1935-1938)).
Interview with Helen Valeska Bary, supra note 53. A colleague described Tate as “sensitive”
to the “social philosophy” behind the New Deal programs. Interview by Peter Corning with
Bernice Lotwin Bernstein, in New York, N.Y. 73 (Apr. 1965) (transcript on file with Oral
History Collection of Columbia University). He was a lawyer who would give “a ‘yes’
answer” when GC Tom Eliot was inclined to say “no.” Interview with Frank Bane, supra
note 56, at 196.
The Social Security Act, like much New Deal legislation, was vulnerable to judicial
evisceration. When Tate wrote his memo in 1936, the legality of the Act had not been tested
before the Supreme Court, but a court challenge appeared inevitable. On complaints about
the Act, see SHERYL R. TYNES, TURNING POINTS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM “CRUEL HOAX”
TO “SACRED ENTITLEMENT” (1996); and Memorandum from Robert Huse to Frank Bane
(June 18, 1936) (on file with NARA II, SSB Records, 47/4/513 Litigation), which recounts
complaints. On the perception that a court challenge was inevitable, see Jack B. Tate, The
Social Security Act, 3 FED. B. ASS’N J. 41 (1937) (defending the constitutionality of the Act);
and Interview with Jack B. Tate, supra note 1, at 78 (recounting that “there was a great deal
of trepidation” about the risk of strict judicial interpretation).
Tate was aware that conservative elements in the legal community, such as the powerful
American Bar Association and the increasingly ornery Roscoe Pound, were skeptical about
agency decisionmaking and likely to use the Due Process Clause as a weapon. By
interpreting the Act in rights terms, Tate may have been trying to head off such attacks.
Historians have found that such thinking motivated other New Deal lawyers. See, e.g.,
TOMLINS, supra note 100, at 154 (noting that the NLRB chose a legalistic model for
enforcing the Wagner Act, in part because GC Charles Fahy wanted “the best chance of
success in establishing the constitutionality” of the controversial act); Joanna Grisinger, Law
in Action: The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 379,
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believed that procedural protections were vital to achieving the Act’s goals132
and that references to rights would lend authority to his interpretation. The
important point, for our purposes, is that these conversations and debates
planted within another pocket of the Agency the notion that rights were not
anathema to the public assistance program; in fact, they were at its very core.
In subsequent years, when public assistance seemed to be slipping back in time
to the “old poor law,” bureaucrats from across the mezzo level would turn to
rights language to attempt to reclaim it for the New Deal.
iii. the enduring problem of the local
Several years into the program, the Social Security Board still employed its
carrot-and-stick approach, described in Part I, to encourage more modern state
public assistance plans. But increasingly, the content of those plans was not the
SSB’s biggest problem. “[T]he actuality is worse than the plan,” came the
refrain from federal agents in the field.133 It was enough to give even Frank
Bane, the SSB’s Executive Director and a longtime leader of public welfare
reform, cause for reflection. “[N]o nation can wisely legislate beyond its
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388 (2008) (noting that many advocates of administration saw voluntary adoption of
rigorous procedural protections as a way to minimize judicial review of agency decisions).
It is possible that Tate was eager to preserve a space for lawyers within the crowded New
Deal bureaucracy and therefore thought it important to stand his ground when dealing with
a term that was quintessentially legal. As Tate once observed in an address to other federal
government lawyers, there were many terms in the Social Security Act—“need,”
“employer”—that other experts in the bureaucracy (e.g., social workers or accountants)
could interpret just as well as lawyers. But other terms—e.g., “contract of hire”—were
within the lawyer’s exclusive jurisdiction. Jack B. Tate, The Problem of Advice in the
Administration of Social Security Laws, 3 FED. B. ASS’N J. 319, 320 (1939); see also A. Delafield
Smith, A Department of Public Welfare and the Office of the State’s Attorney-General, 12 SOC.
SERV. REV. 216, 225 (1938) (noting the distinction between most issues for agency
determination and those that presented “pure questions of law”). This insight relies
generally on ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR (1988).
Evidence supporting this theory includes the fact that in addition to citing case law, Tate’s
memo defended fair hearings in terms that invoked the Act’s underlying aims. Tate
described fair hearings as “perhaps the most effective instrument” for maintaining adequate
state supervision of local units, “one of the most efficient methods of protecting an
individual from abuse or misuse of administrative authority,” and an antidote to local
prejudice and variance. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, supra note 124, at 2.
Memorandum from A.D. Smith, Principal Attorney, Office of Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec.
Agency, to Jane M. Hoey, Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance, Standards Implementing the Fair
Hearing Requirement of the Social Security Act (Oct. 24, 1939) (on file with NARA II,
HEW Records, 235/12/PA Fair Hearing #1 (1939-1943)).
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capacity to administer,” he conceded in 1939.134 This Part details how federal
administrators came to perceive their local counterparts as the central
roadblock to achieving the Social Security Act’s goals and explains why direct
administrative levers proved insufficient to meet the challenge.
As discussed in Part I, most states were eager to cooperate with the SSB (at
least during the early years).135 But the SSB quickly became concerned about
states’ capacities to fulfill their end of the bargain. State officials came to the
table with all the right props and promises—pleasing charts of bureaucratic
authority and detailed diagrams of their line-and-staff organizations. The
emerging truth, however, was that the thin dendrites on these organizational
charts had far more power than the visual aids implied. The BPA estimated
that of the 45,000 persons employed in state and local public assistance
administration in June 1943, some 38,500, or 86%, worked in offices
established in county, city, or other local government units.136 States delegated
great authority to these units, which processed applications, investigated needs
and resources, and delivered benefits.
States purported to control these local administrators, but federal officials
expressed both increasing uncertainty about the adequacy of that supervision
and increasing certitude about the importance of decisions made at the ground
level. “[V]ery good laws and plans” are not self-executing, BPA director Jane
Hoey observed in 1937; their success depends entirely on “the understanding,
sympathy, knowledge, and skill of those who actually come in contact with
persons in need.”137 Local workers, another experienced public welfare
administrator agreed, were the ones who would see that the laws served their
intended beneficiaries or who would instead “prostitute[]” those laws “to
ulterior political or personal ends.”138 Just what were they doing?
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136.

137.
138.

Frank Bane, The Social Security Board and State Organizations, 202 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 137, 144 (1939).
As the Louisiana episode suggests, and as I have argued elsewhere, state intransigence
became a major problem for the federal agency in the 1950s and early 1960s. See Tani, supra
note 13.
Jack Charnow & Saul Kaplan, Public Assistance Personnel, Jan.-June 1943, 7 SOC. SECURITY
BULL. 20, 20 (1944); see also Div. of Statistics & Analysis, Bureau of Pub. Assistance, Soc.
Sec. Admin., Personnel in State and Local Public Assistance Agencies, June 1949, 13 SOC.
SECURITY BULL. 7, 7 (1950) (reporting similar figures for 1949).
Jane M. Hoey, The Federal Government and Desirable Standards of State and Local
Administration, 1937 PROC. NAT’L CONF. SOC. WORK 440, 442.
Donald S. Howard, Who Shall Be Granted Public Aid? How Much? In What Form?, in THE
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE WORKER: HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO THE APPLICANT, THE COMMUNITY, AND
HIMSELF 41, 44 (Russell H. Kurtz ed., 1938).
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These anxieties stemmed in part from history.139 Anecdotes from the years
of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the intrepid federal
intervention immediately preceding the Social Security Act, revealed, first, that
the machinery of local poor relief was extensive, convoluted, and not at all
uniform.140 Second, the people running the show at the local level were
accustomed to the old paradigm of poor relief. They had not participated in
drafting the new social welfare schemes and many did not share the New
Dealers’ basic worldview. FERA officials somewhat snobbishly described the
local administrators they encountered as amateurs who tended to the poor
“merely as a part-time or extra duty.”141 The best were well meaning but inept;
the worst were corrupt; most were “indifferen[t].”142 FERA’s issuance of
personnel standards helped the federal perspective make inroads, according to
reports, but could not raise the supply of adequately trained persons.143 Third,
not all states proved capable of imposing any kind of standards on local
workers. As late as the 1920s, according to public welfare expert and FERA
administrator Josephine Brown, “[f]ederal and state agencies had little or no
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This paragraph focuses on experiences under the federal relief program immediately
preceding the Social Security Act, but other historical examples abound. For example,
Robert Post has detailed similar state and local intransigence in his account of the
administration of Prohibition. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the
American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
24-26 (2006).
For example, the Council of Social Agencies reported in 1937 that in just one county in
Illinois, there were forty-one independent authorities administering categorical public
assistance (aid to dependent families, needy mothers with children, the blind, veterans, and
the aged), and that in the state at large there were 1,860 local administrative authorities
distributing public funds and services for those falling within these categories of need.
Wilfred S. Reynolds, Public Welfare Administration a Patchwork in Illinois, 11 SOC. SERV. REV.
1, 6 (1937). For an excellent account of the complexities of overlaying federal social welfare
policies on existing state and local relief machinery in one state, see SUSAN STEINROGGENBUCK, NEGOTIATING RELIEF: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS IN
DEPRESSION-ERA MICHIGAN, 1930-1940 (2008).
BROWN, supra note 73, at 14.
Id. at 14-16; see also FRANK Z. GLICK, THE ILLINOIS EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMISSION: A
STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EMERGENCY RELIEF 11-12 (1940)
(describing the myriad “inadequacies” that Illinois emergency relief officials found at the
county level, including unqualified administrators, inefficient handling of “even the clerical
aspects of the job,” and slipshod record keeping); LEVY, supra note 53, at 23 (describing
nepotism, graft, and political manipulation of relief orders as “fairly common practice”
among Pennsylvania poor directors).
BROWN, supra note 73, at 221, 278; Dorothy C. Kahn, Problems in the Administration of Relief,
176 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 40, 43 (1934); Marjorie Anne Merrill, Lessons
Learned in Personnel Selection and Management in Emergency Relief Administration, 1936 PROC.
NAT’L CONF. SOC. WORK 538.
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official relationship with local public outdoor relief.”144 Especially in rural
areas, communities perceived federal and state emergency relief efforts as
“foreign” invasions.145 “We accept [the directives from Washington]” because
people are starving, an old county judge warned one FERA official, “but . . . the
time is coming when we feel that we must again get back into the picture.”146
The federal administrators’ anxieties about the local were not just rooted in
history, however. After the enactment of the Social Security Act and the
approval of state plans, SSB representatives traveling around the nation
reported that local public assistance workers ignored, resisted, or simply failed
to encounter state authority, while they regularly felt the influence of town and
county. One BPA official reported in 1937 that, despite state intervention,
towns in Massachusetts refused to pay Aid to Dependent Children to some
families that were clearly eligible. Local officials were administering the
program in the same way that they had administered mothers’ pensions;
namely, by limiting it to families who had been “settled” in the town for some
time and who met local standards of appropriate conduct.147 (Families deemed
ineligible for ADC might receive public aid, but it would be from “general
relief,” a category that was not federally subsidized and hence not subject to
federal rules about fairness and uniformity.) Similar reports came from the
federal officials monitoring public assistance litigation. A court case in Kansas
revealed to them that a county welfare board—without state agency approval—
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BROWN, supra note 73, at 52.
Id.; see also V.O. KEY, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES 272 (1937)
(“Township and county officials regretted the loss of their historic perquisites as dispensers
of relief.”); STEIN-ROGGENBUCK, supra note 140, at 76-96 (documenting local resistance in
Michigan).
Interview by Peter A. Corning with Loula Dunn, Fed. Emergency Relief Admin., in Wash.,
D.C. 18 (Aug. 3, 1965) (transcript on file with Oral History Collection of Columbia
University).
Memorandum from Rose J. McHugh, Chief, Admin. Surveys Div., to A.D. Smith, Office of
the Gen. Counsel, Massachusetts Aid to Dependent Children Program (Nov. 1, 1937) (on
file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/3/Massachusetts—Aid to Dependent Children);
Memorandum from Rose J. McHugh, Chief, Admin. Surveys Div., to A.D. Smith, Office of
the Gen. Counsel, Massachusetts Aid to Dependent Children Program (Nov. 6, 1937) (on
file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/3/Massachusetts—Aid to Dependent Children); see
also Margaret Leahy, Intake Practices in Local Public Assistance Agencies, SOC. SECURITY BULL.,
Oct. 1941, at 3, 5 (reporting that in some counties, applicants who would have been eligible
for ADC were first placed on general assistance and observed to ensure ability to “manage
cash,” employability, maintenance of a “‘suitable’ home,” etc.); Gertrude Springer, New
England Grass Roots, PUB. WELFARE NEWS, Sept. 1939, at 2, 3 (reporting that in New
England, “[o]ld folks getting assistance, mothers receiving aid for dependent children, are
not especially stigmatized provided they meet the time-honored test of being ‘worthy’ and
keeping a tidy house”).
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had adopted a regulation making automobile ownership grounds for rejecting
applications; county officials removed the plaintiff from the old-age assistance
rolls after finding that his son owned a car.148 Other surveys confirmed the
trend. As a BPA Field Division report summarized in 1941, the establishment of
state supervision was “a slow and tedious process”; “[l]ocal autonomy”
remained “an important factor”; and community “attitudes and pressures”
resulted in “wide variations” in local agency practices.149
Other accounts revealed the political clout of local officials vis-à-vis the
states. “It is . . . a new and not a welcome experience,” Michigan’s state relief
administrator explained in 1937, for local units to apply to the state for funds
and open themselves to state scrutiny.150 Where local units were powerful, they
made their disaffection known. The General Counsel’s office reported in 1940
that when the California state agency attempted to withhold funds from Los
Angeles County to discipline it for neglecting state requirements, the County
drafted a bill depriving the agency of its power. Only federal pressure, the GC
implied, prevented the state legislature from acting.151 County resistance in
another instance—this time, to a state decision regarding an individual ADC
case—was so strong that the same state agency sought a court order compelling
the county auditor to pay the claim.152 Reaction against state direction was not
unique to California. Local public welfare commissioners in New York
“jealously guarded” their autonomy.153 Local government units frightened
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Memorandum from Litig. Section to Leonard J. Calhoun, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Soc. Sec.
Bd., Litigation in Region IX (Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri and Arkansas) 2-3 (Sept. 22,
1939) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/15/Litigation—Region I through XII—
General (1936- )).
Leahy, supra note 147, at 3-4.
Haber, supra note 76, at 445-46.
Memorandum from Fowler V. Harper, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Paul V. McNutt,
Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency, Monthly Report, February, at 11 (Mar. 11, 1940) (on file with
NARA II, HEW Records, 235/12/G—Report (Monthly) #4 (1940)).
Memorandum from Fowler V. Harper, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Paul V. McNutt,
Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency, Monthly Report for May, 1940, at 25 (June 11, 1940) (on file with
NARA II, HEW Records, 235/12/G—Report (Monthly) #4 (1940)). Helen Valeska Bary,
who spent 1935 to 1948 representing the federal agency to the Western states, first as a field
representative and then a regional administrator, confirmed that this was no aberration: the
county welfare directors in her home state of California were a powerful group well into the
1940s and “had a general tendency to resist the state.” Interview with Helen Valeska Bary,
supra note 53, at 175.
Richard T. Gilmartin, An Effective Working Team: State-Local Cooperation, 2 PUB. WELFARE
115, 118 (1944).
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Minnesota’s state agency into sitting on its hands.154 Other state agencies may
not have acted out of fear, but administrators in Indiana, Utah, and Oklahoma,
for example, were so concerned about intruding on local prerogatives that
when asked to review a local decision, they took extraordinary measures to
resolve disputes through back channels or to dissuade claimants from going
forward.155
The records of state welfare directors, social work educators, and others
immersed in public welfare administration convey the problem’s deep and
tangled roots. One Georgia public welfare official, Wilma Van Dusseldorp,
reported to the Southern Sociological Society in 1938 that local workers were
“in the center of almost overwhelming pressures.” “There are hundreds of
applicants—each presenting his need according to his conception of his rights”;
“[t]here is the County Board—composed of people whose interests reflect the
insight and aim of the local and state political factions”; there are the other
county officials “bearing down upon the local workers”; and there are the
“expectations and criticisms” of the “general community.”156 County officials in
Alabama, for example, impressed one touring public welfare consultant with
their eagerness to know whether the public funds granted to “Mr. Jones” were
going to “Ole Man Jones with the farm across Hokey Creek” or to “Peg-leg
Jones who lived on this side of the creek since his wife died last summer.”157
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Edward W. Weidner, State Supervision of Local Government in Minnesota, 4 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
226, 229-30 (1944).
Memorandum from Laurence Dimsdale to Martha E. Phillips, Reg’l Representative, Bureau
of Pub. Assistance, Indiana—Public Assistance Fair Hearings—Procedure and Time Lapse
Between Request and Date of Hearing (Nov. 4, 1946) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records, 235/69/Region V Public Assistance (1944)); Memorandum from Max K. Mangum,
Reg’l Attorney, Region IX, to Riley E. Mapes, Reg’l Representative, Bureau of Pub.
Assistance, Utah Fair Hearing Procedures (Dec. 31, 1946) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records, 235/71/Region IX Public Assistance #2 1944-1946); Memorandum from Reg’l
Attorney to Luna B. Brown, Assoc. Reg’l Representative, Bureau of Pub. Assistance, PA
Oklahoma—Fair Hearings (Sept. 30, 1944) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records,
235/70/Region VII Public Assistance #2); see also Memorandum from Reg’l Attorney to
Phyllis Osborn, Reg’l Representative, Bureau of Pub. Assistance, PA Kansas—Current
Study of Fair Hearing Problem (Mar. 22, 1944) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records,
235/70/Region VII Public Assistance #2) (describing cases in which, after holding a hearing
but before making a decision, the state board sent a private warning or had private
communications with the county director).
Van Dusseldorp, supra note 53, at 62.
Alabama Entertains “Miss Bailey,” PUB. WELFARE NEWS, Apr. 1940, at 2. “Miss Bailey” was a
fictional character invented by writer Gertrude Springer and deployed in monthly columns
in the Survey Midmonthly, a social welfare journal. Springer based her columns on trips into
the field, as well as her own experience as a welfare worker and her extensive network of
professional contacts. Beverly A. Stadum, Gertrude Hill Springer, in BIOGRAPHICAL
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Anonymous “Friend[s],” “Citizen[s],” and “Taxpayer[s]” reportedly sent
public relief agencies daily batches of letters “yelping for the scalp of some poor
client who is suspected of chiseling”: “Mr. Jones has a 1937 Chevrolet”; “How
come a person on widow’s pension can buy diamonds and wrist watches for
her children?”; “Mrs. Jones is just like a prostitute.”158 Neighborly concern,
these anecdotes suggest, could lead to what one administrator described as a
feeling of constant community surveillance.159 Van Dusseldorp recalled one
county director who had spent six months studying social work and hence
“had some ideals about what good practice in public welfare work was,” but
confided that because of the pressures of the job, she might soon be
administering aid in the “old poor relief” manner—federal administrators’
biggest fear.160
State agency reinforcement of “good practice” in public welfare likely
helped some well-intentioned county directors, but in many locations state
agencies could not or would not intervene. Massachusetts, for example,
contained 355 administrative units dealing with relief in 1938, and local units
“adamant[ly] refus[ed] to give up functions even to the next largest
subdivision, the county.”161 With so many recalcitrant jurisdictions, effective
state supervision was challenging. The GC’s general review of fair hearing
records confirmed “a strong parochial influence” in particular areas. Examining
appeals to state agencies from local decisions, the lawyers learned that rather
than issuing uniform regulations or clarifying opinions, state administrators
allowed local boards to decide many matters of “general significance.”162
Of course, federal officials could have brought pressure to bear on these
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DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 683 (Walter I. Trattner ed., 1986). This
particular column was written by a staff member of the Alabama Department of Welfare on
the heels of Springer’s visit to the state. Alabama Entertains “Miss Bailey,” supra, at 2.
Michael Aronson, The Anonymous Complaint in the Public Relief Agency, 4 PUB. WELFARE 36,
36, 39 (1946); see also C.W. Geile, County Administrators Discuss Welfare Needs, PUB.
WELFARE NEWS, Apr. 1939, at 1, 2 (reporting that when county agencies in Indiana
attempted to adhere to the SSB’s “money payment” principle, they were criticized “for
granting old age assistance to alcoholics, gamblers and spendthrifts”; they quickly rejected
the federal guidance).
Leahy, supra note 147, at 4.
Van Dusseldorp, supra note 53, at 61-62.
William Haber & Herman M. Somers, The Administration of Public Assistance in
Massachusetts, 12 SOC. SERV. REV. 397, 410 (1938); accord GLICK, supra note 142, at 226-27
(describing Illinois’s public assistance system as “scattered and unco-ordinated,” and state
supervision as “ineffective or non-existent”).
Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Paul V. McNutt,
Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency, Monthly Report—April, 1941, at 22 (May 12, 1941) (on file with
NARA II, HEW Records, 235/12/G—Report (Monthly) #5 (1941)).
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states by cutting off federal grants (the “stick”), but the limits of this
enforcement tool became apparent soon after the SSB approved the first round
of state plans. In 1937, after hearing whispers that Oklahoma was not
supervising its local units, the SSB sent a task force to investigate. The federal
envoys quickly confirmed the rumors. In one county, Executive Director Frank
Bane recalled, the task force found over 125% of all persons sixty-five years and
older receiving OAA grants.163 “[T]hey were giving out [payments] to names
of tombstones and that sort of thing,” recalled GC Jack Tate.164 The SSB
suspended Oklahoma’s grant, finding that the state’s Public Welfare
Commission had caved to county pressure. But it was in no one’s interest to
keep funds from needy individuals. The sanction lasted only as long as it took
for Oklahoma officials to arrange, on paper, for improved state administration.
With that done, the SSB quickly reinstated the state’s grant (and in fact made
it retroactive, so that the state lost only a month’s worth of federal funds).165
The lesson was not lost on other states.
Personnel standards also failed to bring adequate understanding of the
public assistance programs to local welfare work. Such standards were once the
SSB’s great hope: in 1939, at the SSB’s urging, Congress amended the Social
Security Act to allow the SSB to prescribe “methods relating to the
establishment and maintenance of personnel on a merit basis,” overriding a
provision in the original Act that explicitly denied the Board this power.166
Almost immediately, the SSB issued guidance on how to revise existing merit
systems, or in many cases, create them from scratch. Failure to comply with
federal standards, the SSB warned, could result in de-funding. The merit
amendment strengthened the SSB’s hand in dealing with the many states that
were “still in the clutches of the spoils system.”167
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Yet the arrangements that federal officials negotiated with these states were
of limited use at the local level. Most significantly, not all state legislatures
believed that they had the power to impose merit requirements on local
employees, much less the power to delegate that authority to a state agency. By
November 1940, after negotiating with states for over a year, the GC’s office
was confident that states had a solid legal basis for extending state merit rules
to the local level (local personnel were arguably “engaged in matters of statewide concern”), yet lawyers reported “compromise legislation and home-rule
influence” in many states. This was understandable: up to that point, most
local government units had been “untouched by organized merit systems.”168
In a few states, the issue was so fraught that the legislature would not enact
anything, instead foisting the issue upon the state attorney general or state
supreme court.169 The resulting merit systems often appeared to have bite but
were accompanied by toothless administration.170
The deeper problem was that merit requirements were a crude tool for
securing the sort of workers that federal administrators wanted, namely those
who were skilled in the science of public administration and who had a clear
understanding of the new assistance programs. Professional social workers fit
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376-77 (1958).
STEVENSON, supra note 37, at 191-94.
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to control compensation and tenure. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, supra note 169; see
also Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Paul V. McNutt,
Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency, Monthly Report—April, 1941, at 23 (May 12, 1941) (on file with
NARA II, HEW Records, 235/12/G—Report (Monthly) #5 (1941)) (reporting that in
Georgia, “[t]he tenure of county directors is by law now subject both to the will of the
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the bill, but the SSB was in no position to set the standard so high. Such
professionals were relatively few in number, were unevenly distributed
geographically, and often could make better salaries elsewhere, especially
during the war years.171 Furthermore, they remained unpopular.172 Setting
more realistic standards for education and experience helped get bodies in the
door, but hardly guaranteed the type of workers that the SSB envisioned.
Reports from the field indicated that the average worker joining public
assistance staffs in the late 1930s and early 1940s was relatively well educated
but had little to no familiarity with social work or public assistance
administration.173 As one staff supervisor tactfully put it, the worker came to
the job with “at least a few misunderstandings about the agency’s function,”
some misconceptions about “why certain individuals are poor,” and “certain
reservations about the client’s worthiness.”174 Left to their own devices, the
reports implied, these workers would not administer, but judge—a function
that they were not qualified to perform.
iv. to administer public assistance as a matter of right
The previous Part emphasized the close watch that federal administrators
kept on state public assistance programs in the early years of federal funding,
and their eagerness to see modernity wash over outmoded poor relief
operations. This Part is about what happened next: faced with perceived
parochialism in administration and states that refused to assert forceful
leadership, federal administrators began exploring other options to achieve
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with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/12/G—Report (Monthly) #6 (1942)).
COLL, supra note 51, at 101.
See, e.g., Ellen Forder, Induction of the New Worker into the Agency, PUB. WELFARE NEWS, July
1942, at 2, 2 (cautioning against extended discursions on social work laws and trends with
the new worker, as “new visitors do not have enough knowledge of the field to carry on any
worthwhile discussion”); Springer, supra note 147, at 4 (describing the welfare worker in
one “fairly typical” New England town as “a young home-state girl who left the state
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Untrained, 2 PUB. WELFARE 264, 265 (1944).
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sound administration at the local level. Law and custom prevented them from
training local employees directly: communications were supposed to go from
federal officials to state officials and, at the state’s discretion, from states to the
local level.175 But federal administrators could educate local caseworkers
indirectly, by channeling messages and materials through appropriate
mediators, such as state agencies and schools of social work. This tactic was no
secret: given that the Act deferred to the states on day-to-day administrative
matters, Jane Hoey explained to one social work audience, her Bureau relied on
“counseling and special services” to achieve adequate programs.176 By imbuing
their “counseling and special services” with a robust discourse of rights, federal
administrators attempted to challenge the old poor law ideology animating
local welfare practice, and at the same time to acculturate local workers to
federal norms.177
A. Administration by Indirection
Starting in the late 1930s, federal administrators opened up at least four
indirect means of communicating with local personnel. First, they wrote long
statements interpreting particular legal provisions. These statements were as
philosophical as they were technical, venturing into the history of social
responsibility, the causes of dependency, and the psychology of those in
need.178 The Agency could not distribute these circulars directly to local
agencies, but they sent copies to all state agencies, with the hope that state
supervisors and field agents would educate the public welfare workers in their
orbit.
Second, they offered to help train welfare workers. They were frank about
their motives and blunt in their assessment of local skill. As one BPA official
told the National Conference on Social Welfare, “the need for in-service
training”—which everyone agreed was great—“stands in inverse ratio to the
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adequacy of professional competency of the staff.”179 The BPA’s Division of
Technical Training, headed by a former professor of social work, wrote guides
emphasizing the importance of staff development, listing appropriate reading
materials, identifying “basic problems and current trends” in public assistance,
and outlining topics for worker-orientation sessions.180 These guides were
distributed to state agencies around the nation for use in their own training
programs. Technical Training staff also made themselves available as
consultants to state agencies. In the Division’s first year alone, representatives
visited twenty-two states and the District of Columbia, some jurisdictions
more than once.181
Third, federal administrators took advantage of their strong connections to
social work schools. Most BPA staff members were graduates of such schools
and rooted their professional identities in the training they received there.
Meanwhile, a number of social work educators, such as Edith Abbott and
Sophonisba Breckinridge, maintained tight ties to the federal welfare
bureaucracy. They drafted legislation, served as advisors and consultants to the
federal agency, and funneled students into government service.182 Not many of
those on the front lines of public assistance administration—those taking
applications, visiting homes, and working with clients—had degrees in social
work, but social work education still could exert a strong influence on them.
Through educated supervisors and agency directors, values and lessons trickled
down to the low-level worker. State and local agencies also brought in social
work educators as consultants and sent staff to occasional educational
“institutes.” With federal encouragement, some agencies even made funds
available for local workers to enroll in classes.183
Fourth, federal administrators attempted to reach local personnel through
professional circuits—for example, speeches at state, regional, and national
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Agnes Van Driel, In-Service Training, 1937 PROC. NAT’L CONF. SOC. WORK 426, 428.
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Brown, What We Have Learned About Emergency Training for Public Relief Administration,
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meetings of public welfare and social work organizations, and publications in
professional journals. Most local welfare workers did not attend such meetings
or read such journals, but many higher-ranked state and county personnel did,
and they had access to the workers at the ground level. In short, without other
mechanisms of control, federal administrators pursued whatever lines of
influence they had.
Often, Agency records show, they stressed rights. Public assistance, in these
various communications, was portrayed as the right of those who were eligible:
the government was obligated to give it to those who met the statutory
requirements, and no one could restrict or otherwise interfere with the
claimant’s payments. All those who sought payment, even those who were not
eligible, were also rights-holders: they had the rights to apply, to receive
prompt consideration of their application, and to seek an appeal should they be
dissatisfied. Once on the rolls, an individual had a right to confidentiality: his
or her reliance on the state could not be broadcast to the public, or used to
solicit votes.184 This language of rights appeared nowhere in the Social Security
Act itself, yet it pervaded the guidance that federal officials directed at
untrained local administrators.
B. Rights Language in Context
Federal administrators were in some sense simply speaking the language of
the day: rights language pervaded the cultural and political discourse of the
time. Some of the more memorable examples come from the middle and late
1940s—President Roosevelt’s “Second Bill of Rights” (1944),185 the rightsbased report of President Truman’s historic Committee on Civil Rights
(1947),186 the U.N. General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948)187—but rights language was in the air earlier. As federal
administrators muddled through the Social Security Act’s first years, President
Roosevelt used rights language to launch war preparations. He called
Americans to duty by reminding them of cherished freedoms from oppression
and declaring newer affirmative rights, such as rights to government protection
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against poverty and insecurity.188 He made similar pronouncements in the
midst of the Great Depression, when he urged voters to place their faith in
him. Americans, he assured them, had the “right to live.”189
Even more important than these high-flying rhetorical banners, however,
was the way that rights language had come to operate in conversations about
dependence and freedom. Americans had long perceived these conditions as
incompatible. The former slave who depended on his old master for land and
farming implements was not truly free; nor was the pauper in the almshouse,
or the wage-earner whose company fed and clothed him. Reliance on another
for the necessities of life undermined one’s claim to personal autonomy.190
By the 1930s, rights language seemed to offer a way out of this dilemma.
Using rights language, groups representing organized labor and racial
minorities sought the protection of the government—arguably a sign of
dependence191—while maintaining their independence.192 They used it to
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accept government aid without conceding their freedom. For example, even as
he condemned the federal government for allowing local New Deal
administrators to restore African Americans to the conditions of slavery,
Chicago Defender founder Robert S. Abbott urged his substantial African
American readership to fight for government aid. There was nothing wrong, he
implied, with aid programs that treated participants as “full-fledged citizens
with guaranteed privileges and respected rights.”193 A. Philip Randolph used
rights language to similar effect in 1941 when he called African Americans to
march on Washington to demand fair employment practices. Seeking this sort
of state protection could be understood as a sign of dependence, yet Randolph
turned it into a campaign for freedom: “We would rather die on our feet
fighting for Negroes’ rights,” he declared, “than to live on our knees as
halfmen, as semi-citizens, begging for a pittance.”194
To speak in terms of rights, in other words, was not just a way of
characterizing something as important or sacred; it was a way of seeking
government protection and intervention without assuming the posture of the
supplicant, the slave, or the ward.195 This was the chain of meaning that federal
administrators tugged behind them as they spread the language of rights into
remote corners of the welfare state.
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C. Rights Language in Administration
Of the many federal administrators who spoke of rights in the late 1930s
and 1940s, the most vocal was Assistant General Counsel A. Delafield Smith,
the lawyer who supervised the GC’s public assistance work from 1938 to 1955.
Like many of his colleagues, Smith was well educated (Princeton, Harvard
Law) and eager to defend the New Deal. But he stood out for being “very
intense” and “very dedicated.”196 To make a point during a Board meeting, he
once walked across the room on his hands.197 On another occasion, he
reportedly asked his heavily pregnant secretary, when she finally told him she
had to stop work, “[C]an’t you put that off a little while?”198 One of Smith’s
firmest convictions was that the public assistance programs had a distinct legal
and philosophical basis. A second belief was that many administrators, most
especially those outside of federal employ, failed to understand this basis. He
dedicated much of his career to correcting their misapprehensions, often using
the language of rights. The “principles” animating the new public assistance
laws could and must be stated “in very simple terms.”199
A typical example is Smith’s 1939 speech to the Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Schools of Social Work, the organization most directly
responsible for educating future public assistance leaders. Smith characterized
the social work notables in the audience, as well as their trainees, as mediators
between public assistance laws and the poor. He described their day-to-day
work in rights terms. They were the ones, he explained, who would provide
“daily interpretation” of the new rights that modern social legislation had
created.200 On their skills the New Deal would succeed or fail.
Similar themes animated a paper that Smith presented at the 1941 meeting
of the National Conference of Social Work and later published in the Social
Service Review (the premier academic journal in the social welfare field).
Increasingly, Smith pointed out, government guaranteed the basic security of
individuals, both through programs called “insurance” and others not so
named. In all such programs, new rights were created. Smith encouraged his
audience to think of these rights as trusts and to think of modern
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administrative agencies as trust fund managers.201 Although agencies did not
dictate the value of the trusts, their principles and procedures confirmed to
claimants that the government’s word was good. He urged his social work
audience never to forget that the legislation was designed “to create adequate
sanction for these rights, [and] to secure certainty and regularity in their
operation.”202 As Smith put it in a later publication, a sense of social and
economic security “requires the knowledge that what we obtain we obtain as of
right.”203 It was a knowledge that local welfare workers were uniquely situated
to impart.
Smith hit the same notes when helping draft guidance to states that would,
in turn, influence state-local interactions. In correspondence with the Bureau of
Public Assistance in 1940 about a manual for BPA field personnel, Smith
suggested introducing the section on fair hearings with an observation about
the “new rights” that recent social legislation had created. This would impress
on the reader, Smith hoped, the importance of treating beneficiaries justly,
equitably, and objectively.204 Smith also suggested supplementing the manual
with the reminder “that each individual shall be entitled as a matter of right to
the uniform application of the State’s criteria of eligibility and standard of
need.”205 Such language made clear that, in contrast with the old poor law, the
Act generated an individual right to “equitable treatment.”206
In short, Smith was making what he once described as “an appeal for an
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attitude,” an attitude different from what had been the norm.207 He wanted to
show welfare workers that even though the means of delivering public
assistance might resemble traditional poor relief, in terms of personnel,
location, and payment amounts, a basic divide had formed. On one side was
the old poor law, with its haphazard administration, discretionary payments,
and capricious and condescending charity mindset. Custom was certainly on
this side, and yet, Smith hoped to convey, it was not a good place to be. On
the other side was the new legislation, based on rational, scientific
administration and payments as a matter of right. Smith wanted welfare
workers to know that when they dealt with poor individuals in the protected
categories, they must stand on the progressive, modern side of the divide, and
further, that they should feel proud of where they stood.208 When workers
know that they are “administering to legal rights” rather than doling out
charity, Smith insisted to a colleague, they fulfill their responsibilities with
“zeal” and “conscientiousness.”209 In short, rights do what neither state
supervision nor remote threats of federal defunding could make them do.
Other federal administrators turned with equal enthusiasm to the language
of rights, both to explain the nature of the individual’s claim on the state and to
clarify how each claimant ought to be treated. At the National Conference of
Social Work in 1941, for example, BPA director Jane Hoey called attention to
the Social Security Act’s guarantees of a fair hearing, cash payment, and
confidentiality.210 The common denominator, she hoped that agencies would
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(Sept. 26, 1941) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/1/2).
Congress added provisions regarding confidentiality to the Act in 1939, after federal
administrators observed state and local officials using information from public assistance
agencies to buy votes, either from poor beneficiaries or from disgruntled taxpayers. See
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, tit. I, § 101, 53 Stat. 1360, 1361
(mandating that state plans “provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of
information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes directly connected with the
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soon appreciate, was a commitment to the right to assistance and the rights of
the individuals who applied for and received aid; rights were “inherent” in
Congress’s policy choices.211 At the same meeting, BPA field worker Margaret
Leahy reported that such an appreciation was indeed building: she saw “the
concept of assistance as a right” gradually replacing “the old poor-law
traditions”—thanks in part, she emphasized, to “continuous interpretation and
leadership.”212 A similar message reached state agencies, and through them,
local agencies, via a 1944 BPA circular on “Money Payments.” The requirement
that assistance take the form of cash, the circular explained, could be boiled
down to “the basic principle underlying the act”: “[T]hat assistance comes to
needy persons as a right,” a right that brings with it the freedom to go about
life in the same way as other community members.213
But the most direct example of rights language in public assistance
administration was Public Assistance Report No. 8, or Common Human Needs:
An Interpretation for Staff in Public Assistance Agencies.214 The BPA’s Division of
Technical Training commissioned it in 1944, after what it described as
“frequent requests” for training materials.215 Public assistance supervisors badly
needed a text to “interpret[] [the] basic philosophy of the program” and to
help local welfare workers “develop constructive attitudes in dealing with
people in need.”216 For authorship, the BPA tapped psychiatric social worker
Charlotte Towle, who had taught at the University of Chicago School of Social
Service Administration and had recently developed a textbook of social case
records.217
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administration of [the assistance programs]”); id. tit. IV, § 401, 53 Stat. at 1380 (same); id.
tit. VII, 53 Stat. at 1397 (same); Ida C. Merriam, The Protection and Use of Information
Obtained Under the Social Security Act, 4 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 13 (1941).
Hoey, supra note 17, at 13.
Leahy, supra note 147, at 3.
FED. SEC. AGENCY, supra note 178, at ii. Hoey published a similar document in the Social
Security Bulletin, where other public welfare administrators presumably read it. Jane M.
Hoey, The Significance of the Money Payment in Public Assistance, 7 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 3
(1944).
TOWLE, supra note 18.
Memorandum from Agnes Van Driel, Chief, Technical Training Serv., Bureau of Pub.
Assistance, to Jane [M]. Hoey et al., Draft (Nov. 1, 1944) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records, 235/215/672.1 Need Project).
See id.
Wendy B. Posner, Common Human Needs: A Story from the Prehistory of Government by
Special Interest, 69 SOC. SERV. REV. 188, 192-94 (1995); Guide to the Charlotte Towle Papers
1915-1968, UNIV. OF CHI. LIBRARY (2007), http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/scrc/findingaids
/view.php?eadid=icu.spcl.towle.
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Local welfare workers were the report’s intended targets, and again, rights
were the language of choice. As Jane Hoey wrote in the report’s foreword, the
Agency hoped that the material would aid in securing “a staff with conviction
regarding the social purpose of this government service based on human
rights.”218 The report itself devoted many pages to understanding human
behavior and psychology, but Towle made clear that the notion of “right” was
at the heart of the public assistance programs. She opened the report by
declaring that “public assistance services achieve their broad social purpose
only when” administrators understand the notion of “sound individualization
in a program based on right.”219 And throughout her discussions of “basic
needs,” “human motives,” and “personality growth,”220 was the message that
the worker must treat each assistance applicant as a rights-bearing individual:
regardless of the applicant’s deportment, the worker’s discomfort, or the
community’s attitude, all eligible persons have a right to financial assistance.
The administrator must approach all cases with “genuine conviction as to the
applicant’s rightful claim on society in time of need.”221 The report went to
press in the summer of 1945, and the BPA distributed the first run—five
thousand copies—to regional public assistance offices, for redistribution to
state and local agencies. Two years later, the report was in its third printing
and was on its way to becoming a classic text in social work education.222
These statements arguably contradicted the federal agency’s ongoing
campaign to build support for Old-Age Insurance, a campaign that depended
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Jane M. Hoey, Foreword to TOWLE, supra note 18, at iii, iii.
TOWLE, supra note 18, at vii (emphasis added). Another report commissioned in 1944, which
the Bureau distributed to public assistance agencies in 1946, urged similar views on its
readers. In The Nature of Service in Public Assistance Administration, author Grace Marcus
describes “administering assistance as a right” as the agency’s responsibility; caseworkers
had an obligation “to see that the right to assistance acquires meaning and value to each
individual.” MARCUS, supra note 17, at 4-5. This report received a more hesitant
endorsement from the BPA because in addition to emphasizing rights, Marcus downplayed
services. COLL, supra note 51, at 138. (She described services as but “the instrument through
which [an individual’s] need may be met as a matter of right” and encouraged social
workers not to foist them on people. MARCUS, supra note 17, at 11.) Not wanting to provoke
those in the social work community who saw services as a necessary complement to money,
Hoey distributed Marcus’s report with the preface that the analysis “indicated need for
further study” and that the report was “not an official publication of the Administration.”
Jane M. Hoey, Foreword to MARCUS, supra note 17, at iii, iii; see COLL, supra note 51, at 138.
TOWLE, supra note 18, at viii.
Id. at 23.
Posner, supra note 217, at 200. Subsequently, the report would gain infamy. See Tani, supra
note 13, at 115-66 (using the conservative backlash against the report as an example of how
rights discourse came to seem dangerous to social workers by the late 1940s).
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on the exclusivity of rights language and the downgrading of citizens’ claims to
assistance.223 But legally, public assistance administrators felt that they were on
solid ground. In a 1937 memo to the SSB’s Informational Service, Assistant
General Counsel Leonard Calhoun warned that “[a] needy person may have
just as much right to assistance under Title I as a qualified individual has to
benefits under Title II,” payment of contributions notwithstanding.224 Attorney
A. Delafield Smith echoed this view in a 1940 article in the Social Security
Bulletin, the monthly periodical of the Social Security Board. “[T]he function
of the State is fundamentally the same in relation to both insurance and
assistance programs,” he explained to his fellow government technocrats. In
both instances, the legislation creates “an actual right.”225
Still, one might predict that the leadership of the SSB would muffle public
assistance administrators’ uses of rights language, regardless of how
descriptively accurate or administratively useful that language was. But that is
not what happened. Perhaps it was because the audience, public welfare
workers, did not overlap with the population that the Agency’s Old-Age
Insurance campaign aimed to reach, namely, the working men and women
who might be tempted to press for a more radical alternative to social
insurance. Perhaps the war made the Agency reluctant to take any stand that
appeared unfriendly to individual rights. Perhaps, having convinced Congress
in 1939 to extend Old-Age Insurance payments to wage earners’ survivors (a
dramatic and important extension, as historian Alice Kessler-Harris has
noted226), top-level administrators believed the program was politically secure.
In any case, Agency leadership in the 1940s tolerated and then cautiously
supported the notion that public assistance came to recipients as a matter of
right and brought with it certain legal protections. In 1944, SSB chairman
Arthur Altmeyer said outright that “both types of payments—assistance grants
and insurance benefits—are received as a matter of statutory right.” The
difference was simply that the insurance beneficiary, by reason of his
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See supra Section II.A.
Memorandum from Leonard Calhoun, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Office of the Gen. Counsel,
to Louis Resnick, Federal Old-Age Benefits Approved Terminology (Mar. 10, 1937) (on file
with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/4/OAI Informational Service).
A. Delafield Smith, Citizenship and Family Security, 3 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 3, 8 (1940); see
also Report of the Regional Attorneys Conference, supra note 14, at 80 (recording statements
by federal agency attorneys that the “rights of the individuals” in both OAI and OAA “arise
from the same source and are of precisely the same character,” and that “the time ha[d]
come” to consider both programs as “parts of a single, so-called security program”).
Alice Kessler-Harris, “Designing Women and Old Fools”: The Construction of the Social Security
Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY 87 (Linda Kerber, Alice KesslerHarris & Kathryn Kish Sklar eds., 1995).
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contributions, was more likely to feel “confiden[t] about his right.”227
By the mid-1940s, references to rights—contrasted inevitably with the
stigmatizing gratuities of the old poor law—were a staple of federal public
assistance communications. As one regional attorney commented in a routine
internal memo, federal administrators were “striving to establish the principle
that, where one meets the requirements of the law, assistance to him is a matter
of right rather than a matter of pleasure to be given by the State.”228 Or as she
put it in the next sentence, they were guarding against “reversion to the
philosophy that assistance is charity”—a philosophy that still seemed to have a
hold in communities where low-level welfare administrators lived and
worked.229 The nonattorneys working for the federal government spoke in the
same language; this was not simply lawyers speaking in the language they
knew best. For example, at their 1944 conference, members of the BPA’s
Regional Staff congratulated trained social workers (which they all were) for
accepting and spreading the principle of “public assistance as a right”
throughout public welfare administration. At the same gathering, they
discussed how to overcome the irrational “feelings and attitudes” that
prevented lower-level staff workers from truly embracing the rights concept.230
State and local records came to reflect this sustained federal effort. The
Idaho welfare department’s July 1942 “Manual of Policies and Procedures”
stated that it was “the legal and democratic right of any person to make
application for assistance, to receive equitable consideration of his application,
and to receive assistance provided he is eligible.”231 Oklahoma’s 1944
orientation materials explained that the welfare worker’s job was “to see that
people eligible under the law get [assistance],” and thereafter to respect the
client’s spending choices.232 By the mid-1940s, agency heads well outside of
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Arthur J. Altmeyer, Persistent Problems in Social Security, 2 PUB. WELFARE 258, 259 (1944).
Board member George Bigge made a similar comment in a 1944 piece in the Social Security
Bulletin. The public assistance titles were indeed based on the concept of right, he observed.
The problem was that existing laws and administrative practices made that right “quite
ethereal.” George E. Bigge, Looking Ahead in Public Assistance, 7 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 4, 8
(1944).
Memorandum from Lillian L. Poses, Reg’l Attorney, to Alice J. Weber, Reg’l
Representative, Bowe Case (Feb. 15, 1946) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records,
235/68/Region II—Public Assistance 1944-1946).
Id.
[Cordelia] Trimble, Comments on Money Payments at Regional Staff Conference, Bureau
of Public Assistance (May 12, 1944) (transcript available at NARA II, SSA Records, 47/193).
McEvoy, supra note 165, at 292-93.
Bureau of Pub. Assistance, Conference of Reg’l Staff, Personnel, May 13, 1944, at 45 (on file
with NARA II, SSA Records, 47/193).
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Washington could be heard referring to “the right to assistance” as the
program’s “fundamental premise.”233 It was both the essence of modern poor
relief and, in its implications, a shorthand for appropriate administrative
practices.
v. rights as a language of the state
Reflecting on the effect of their educational campaigns, some federal
administrators reported remarkable success. In a session at the University of
Pennsylvania School of Social Work, a member of the SSB’s regional staff
witnessed a group of Maryland public assistance workers go “wild” when a
representative of a private family agency confessed to giving out relief in kind
rather than in cash.234 They “all but tore her apart and almost tossed her out
the window,” leaving her with “a great feeling of inferiority.”235 This
demonstrated, in the observer’s view, an acceptance of the rights-based
philosophy that federal administrators had labored so hard to entrench in state
and local agencies.236
Although suggestive, this evidence falls far short of proving that such
understanding truly permeated public welfare administration. As
anthropologist James C. Scott has cautioned, “We must never assume that
local practice conforms with state theory.”237 Likewise, it is difficult to ascertain
whether welfare recipients heard and embraced the rights language that federal
administrators channeled into their local welfare departments. Some observers
insisted that client attitudes had changed,238 while others emphasized the many
ways in which public assistance administrators and the broader public made
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JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
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See, e.g., STEIN-ROGGENBUCK, supra note 140, at 182 (concluding, based on a review of
county-level ADC records in Michigan, that recipients “sought to maintain an active role in
the planning of their cases” and that “many believed that their own circumstances or
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recipients feel ashamed, undeserving, and impotent. What the previous Parts
of this Article do establish is that scholars have overlooked a vibrant discourse
of rights within the welfare state—not within the administration of Social
Security, a program long recognized as one based on entitlement and directed
at rights-bearing individuals, but within the administration of public
assistance, a program often associated with ignominy and inferior status.
This finding invites a broader inquiry into the role of rights language in
American history. To some extent, this is an old question, which has by now
received its scholarly due. Yet existing work has almost uniformly focused on
the rights language of claimants or their advocates, a language targeted at
judges, legislators, or the court of public opinion. In Section V.A, this Article
lends new insights to that tradition, by pairing it with historians’ observations
about twentieth-century state-building and its discontents. But the Article’s
most important contribution is in Section V.B, where the focus shifts to “rights
as a language of the state”: the rights language in this Article is notable for
emanating from federal government officials and targeting local bureaucrats, to
whom it sent a message about the ambitions of the nation-state and the fate of
local citizens.
A. Rights as Quid Pro Quo?
“Rights talk” is, by now, a well-worn topic. Scholarly interest dates to the
1960s, when the proliferation of rights-based social movements and the
hollowness of previous rights victories raised questions about Americans’
seeming preoccupation with legalism and rights-claiming.239 By the 1980s,
following Stuart Scheingold, many scholars agreed that rights claims were a
“political resource,” similar to “money, numbers, status, and so forth,” which
could be deployed in or out of courts.240 Beyond that, however, “rights talk”
scholars diverged.
One set of scholars debated whether the use of rights language was “good”
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Formative scholarship includes MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964);
JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1964); Lawrence M.
Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 29 (1969); and Clifford
Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 47 (David E. Apter ed.,
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STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 7 (1974). On the influence of The Politics of Rights, see Michael Paris, The Politics of
Rights: Then and Now, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1016 n.24 (2006) (reviewing STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE
(Univ. of Mich. Press 2004) (1974)), which offers a preliminary list of “work strongly
influenced by Scheingold.”

369

the yale law journal

122:314

2012

or “bad”—progressive or conservative, stimulating or stunting, a realistic tool
for achieving change or an empty promise. The fierceness of the debate
reflected forces internal and external to the academy: on the outside, the
continued popularity of rights-focused political strategies in the 1970s and
1980s, the perceived expansion of judicially recognized rights, and the
endurance of the injustices that rights purported to address; on the inside, the
“linguistic” or “cultural turn,” which called into question whether rights had
any “real” content or objective foundation, and the insistence, by some legal
and political philosophers, that rights be “taken seriously” as a basis for
jurisprudence.241
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Conservative voices charged that rights were expanding beyond their legitimate bounds,
and that excessive talk of rights destroyed community and disabled institutions.
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Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 714-15, 719-21 (2011).
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critiques of rights, intellectual historian Thomas Haskell noted that “[w]hether or not we
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cultural practice,” id. at 984, and that rights themselves are “durable” if not eternal
conventions “capable of commanding rational allegiance” and thereby “provid[ing] public
life with sufficient order and continuity,” id. at 1005. Other defenders—often women and
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Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Minow, supra, at 1911; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of
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A second set of “rights talk” scholars engaged in a similarly wide-ranging,
albeit less contentious, dialogue about the role of rights language in the
American past and its likely place in the American future. Some emphasized the
ways in which the “rights talk” of the modern era was unique, even
revolutionary. They sought to explain the “rights revolution” and chart its
trajectory.242 Others took a longer view, identifying “rights talk” as “a relatively
stable and permanent social convention.”243 Change over time occurred, they
agreed, but it was in the groups of Americans that deployed rights language
and the content, both practical and aspirational, of their claims.244
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Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 590
(1986); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,
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Reich maintained that rights were necessary to protect individuals from “the aggressively
advancing invasion of the organized sector.” Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100
YALE L.J. 1409, 1411 (1991).
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985) (sketching out a rising expectation
of complete recompense); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY
OF LAW (2001) (arguing that by the late twentieth century, governmental policies,
institutions, bodies of law, and the legal profession had induced a “legalistic” type of
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a language of legal rights); JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002)
(emphasizing the importance of rights to America’s image during the Cold War and
describing the institutionalization of this commitment in particular federal agencies).
Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” 74 J.
AM. HIST. 1013, 1015-16 (1987).
See, e.g., RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS (1999) (citing episodes
from the Founding, the Reconstruction era, and the post-World War II period to
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Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak”: Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of
Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. AM. HIST. 463, 463, 490, 492 (1995)
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husband/parent/master’s customary right to exert private violence); Hartog, supra note 243,
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redistribut[ion],” even as they carry with them the baggage of previous rights claimers);
Felicia Kornbluh, To Fulfill Their “Rightly Needs”: Consumerism and the National Welfare
Rights Movement, 69 RADICAL HIST. REV. 76, 78 (1997) (using an episode in welfare rights
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The result of these two streams of scholarship—the explicitly normative
and the more historical—is a fractious, voluminous “rights talk” literature. Yet
in one sense the literature coheres: it assumes that rights language is the tool of
the rights claimer. Such language articulates what the speaker believes is, or
should be, a right, whether due process or a decent home. And it is directed at
the public or the institution capable of vindicating the putative claim.
One might characterize the rights language uncovered in this Article as a
novel variation on this theme. Welfare recipients in this era did not grasp onto
rights language and march into court, as they did in the 1960s, but they might
have extracted from it an important claim: a claim against an expanding and
potentially overbearing state. Historian William Novak hints at this possibility
in a 2001 essay on “the legal origins of the modern American state.”245 He
argues that Americans could tolerate the rise of a powerful, central government
only if an expansion of individual rights accompanied it: “An expanded zone of
private protection and individual autonomy was quid pro quo for the radical
extension of state power”; new rights against the state (for example, to privacy,
personhood, civil liberty, and social protection) “were an indispensable part of
the new balance” of power.246 Historian James Sparrow has advanced a similar
theory in his recent study of World War II-era state-building: “[R]ights claims
directed at the federal government became an increasingly pervasive, even
paradigmatic feature of politics,” he suggests, because national power had
expanded in ways that were hidden from view and difficult for the ordinary
person to understand.247 Grants of individual rights, the new “coin of that
realm,”248 helped Americans “c[o]me to terms with massive structures of
national power.”249
This quid pro quo theory maps onto the evidence from the welfare
context—to a point. First, there is no doubt that in the 1930s and 1940s, as a
consequence of forceful depression and wartime governance, the national state
became exponentially more powerful and controversial. Americans witnessed
robust executive leadership and sweeping legislative reforms, many involving
an expansion of national administrative capacities and direct interferences with
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daily life.250 Abroad, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union provided potent
examples of the dangers of strong central states.251 Second, New Deal public
assistance programs shared with other expansions of central-state authority
certain alarming features. Had Roscoe Pound, for example, turned his eye to
these programs, he would have found yet another invitation to “administrative
absolutism.”252 Public assistance administration appeared to commingle
adjudicative, legislative, and executive functions with little regard for the
American tradition of separation of powers.253 Third, rights language was an
increasingly obvious antidote to anti-statists’ accusations of an overly powerful
central-state government. America’s commitment to rights, leading political
and intellectual figures testified, kept totalitarian impulses in check and
American democracy healthy. By according all citizens, as a matter of right, fair
treatment, participation in government, and a free airing of opinion, the
United States could never become like its enemies.254
We might therefore assume that federal administrators’ rights language
was, at bottom, a quid pro quo: by offering rights claims—claims on the
government’s treasury and against abusive state power—administrators
attempted to make palatable the central government’s expansive new role. And
yet the rights language from the welfare context does not quite fit, because in
this policy arena, the federal government was not a threat to the American
people; its power remained concealed.255 As the earlier Parts of this Article
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LEGAL ORTHODOXY 217-20 (1992); Roscoe Pound, The Recrudescence of Absolutism, 47
SEWANEE REV. 18, 27 (1939).
CIEPLEY, supra note 45, at 194-200; HORWITZ, supra note 253, at 255-58. The foundational
work on this topic remains EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 13 (2009) (describing Americans’ longstanding
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demonstrate, local authorities, under the supervision of state agencies,
administered public assistance benefits.256 Surely they noted the federal
government’s burgeoning influence, because they had to comply with new
federal rules and accede to federal oversight. But the poor, the purported
beneficiaries of the new rights, would not have perceived a domineering federal
presence. In other words, the overall growth of the national state was
undoubtedly frightening during this period, but in this particular policy area,
ordinary Americans had little reason to perceive a threat. Without a motive for
exchange, the quid pro quo theory fails to make sense of the rights language
that appeared so persistently in welfare administration during this period.
B. Rights as the Language of an Ambitious National State
Rather than forcing this administrative rights language into the enduring
and powerful “rights talk” tradition, we should consider whether a different
phenomenon is at work. The rights language here is not the language of
would-be claimants, for it articulates the rights claims of others without
necessarily involving the claimants themselves. It is the language of the state. It
expresses the ambitions of the national government, this Section argues, or
rather, the ambitions of those who, with varying degrees of intentionality,
encouraged that government to take an ever greater role in governing the
American people.
A basic insight provides the starting point: articulating a rights claim
conveys a message about the relationship between the speaker—here, agents of
the federal government—and the purported rights-holder. In the 1930s and
1940s, the federal government, states, and localities were jockeying for
influence over the individuals within their borders; the federal government was
ascendant, but important pockets of state and local authority remained. One
such pocket was poor relief.257 The rights language emanating from federal
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preference to keep the “General Government” out of sight and explaining the ways in which
exercises of federal power were hidden and masked in the nineteenth century).
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
I have borrowed the idea of “pockets” of the American state from Daniel Carpenter.
Carpenter urges agency-specific and subject-matter-specific studies of state-building as a
necessary complement to the more synthetic studies of scholars like Skowronek.
CARPENTER, supra note 98, at 6. Other policy areas that remained tightly tied to the local
level at this time included education and policing. See TRACY L. STEFFES, SCHOOL, SOCIETY,
AND STATE: A NEW EDUCATION TO GOVERN MODERN AMERICA, 1890-1940, at 11 (2012)
(arguing that in the first several decades of the twentieth century, schools were “a local and
state project,” “national in scope” but still characterized by local control); David H. Bayley,
Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and
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agencies warned that even this terrain would be contested: if poor relief came
with federally guaranteed rights, then state and local governments could no
longer treat their poor citizens however they liked, nor could they command
exclusive loyalty.258
This theory may seem unintuitive. In the United States today, membership
in the national polity is of primary importance. Whether because of the
success of contemporary civil rights movements,259 the orientation
of citizenship theorists,260 or the contemporary allure of belonging to a
nation-state,261 “membership in the federal polity” now appears to “trump[]
all subordinate memberships and uniformly regulate[] the general rights and
duties of all citizens.”262 For much of American history, however, “subordinate”
relationships—to communities, associations, religious organizations,
households, and corporations—performed the work of governance and shaped
individuals’ understanding of their place in the world. Together with the
common law, these relationships established what each individual owed to the
collective, and what that individual was entitled to expect in return.263
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Historical Studies, 1 CRIME & JUST. 109, 125-26, 131 (1979) (characterizing policing in the
United States as extremely decentralized and locally controlled).
Cf. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (2005) (arguing that
during the brief period in which the national government committed to enforcing civil
rights statutes in the Reconstruction South, state and local authorities perceived a direct
threat to their authority, and specifically, their authority over the lowest-status members of
their communities).
William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America, in
THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 85, 8586 (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003).
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 23
(2006) (“Citizenship is presumed [by many scholars] . . . to be a national enterprise—a set
of institutions and practices that necessarily take place within the political community, or
the social world, of the nation-state.”).
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM 15-16 (1983) (characterizing modern nation-states as “imagined political
communities,” made “imaginable” by a distinct set of historical circumstances).
Novak, supra note 259, at 101; see also Martha Derthick, Introduction to DILEMMAS OF SCALE
IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 1, 9 (Martha Derthick ed., 1999) (observing that
although “we take the existence of a powerful national government as a fact of political life,”
“the idea that the nation is the primary political community” is a historical creation, built
over generations).
Novak, supra note 259, at 94-105; see also Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The
Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391,
1397-98 (1993) (finding that many states accorded aliens voting rights in the nineteenth
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With the struggle over slavery and the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the content of national citizenship took on a new importance,264
but into the twentieth century, polities other than the nation-state strongly
affected Americans’ daily experience of governance. State and local
governments made demands on individuals—tax payments, for example, and
public service. To a degree that Americans often overlook, state and local
governments were also rigorous regulators. In the name of the common good,
they not only provided benefits, they secured crucial infrastructure, abated
public nuisances, fought disease, regulated consumer goods, and policed public
morality.265 The reality, as of 1935, was that federal government, states, and
localities all governed, in different ways, the individuals within their borders.
By extension, it was possible for these differentially situated individuals to
understand themselves as members of a national polity and yet recognize, as
one local charity executive did in 1937, that “citizens of the United States are
born and live and die in a local setting.”266
Within this pluralism, social welfare was one area of governance that
remained tied to the local level. Americans had long believed that under normal
circumstances,267 care of the poor was a local responsibility. Funds might come
from outside sources, but local authorities ought to decide which of the
purportedly needy received handouts, how much they received, and on what
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century, and that in doing so, they “recognize[d] mean[s] of citizenship apart from the
notion of mere membership in the nation-state”).
The historical literature on citizenship in the United States is rich, and I do not do it
justice here. Works that have informed my understanding of citizenship include MARGOT
CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2009); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001); ROGERS M. SMITH,
CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); BARBARA
YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY
UNITED STATES (2010); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United
States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440 (1998); and Linda K. Kerber, The Meanings of
Citizenship, 84 J. AM. HIST. 833 (1997).
STERETT, supra note 108, at 55; Novak, supra note 259, at 105-12.
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA (1996).
Pierce Atwater, The County as a Unit for Co-ordinate Planning and Service in Public and Private
Social Work, 1937 PROC. NAT’L CONF. SOC. WORK 369, 369.
In times of perceived “emergency” or “disaster,” Americans tended to be more
open-minded. Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility and “Natural” Disaster Relief: Narrating
the American Welfare State, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257, 259-60 (1999); see Michele L. Landis,
“Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare
State 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967 (1998).
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terms. If citizenship is, as some theorists argue, about an exchange of allegiance
and compliance for protection,268 the poor were clearly local citizens first.
The Great Depression offered the federal government a prime opportunity
to expand its jurisdiction: by providing social and economic protections, the
federal government could build and strengthen its bonds with individuals, at
the expense of state and local authority. Indeed, as political scientist Suzanne
Mettler has argued, the New Deal old-age insurance program did just that.
Federally administered, according to federally determined procedures and
standards, Social Security encouraged recipients to consider themselves
members of the national political community.269 On Mettler’s account, the
public assistance program was a missed opportunity for federal state-builders.
In deference to long-held beliefs about the nature and function of poor relief, as
well as to the concerns of powerful Southern senators, the federal government
heavily subsidized the public assistance program but left day-to-day
administration to the state and local levels, where particularized standards of
deservingness reigned. These terms signaled that beneficiaries belonged to
state and local polities; no federal relationship was implied.270
Or so it would appear on paper. While Mettler correctly diagrams the
system of “divided citizenship” built into New Deal social welfare programs,
her account overlooks the actual practices of federal administrators—people
such as SSB executive director Frank Bane, who in 1937 toured the country to
announce that “citizenship” included “allegiance not only to a certain locality
and a particular State, but to the nation.”271 Using rights language,
administrators seemed to be reaching for the citizens whom the statutes left
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See PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP 176 (1998) (explaining that when citizenship is deployed “as a positive
concept,” it “describes a relationship between individuals and the polity in which citizens
owe allegiance to their polity—they must not betray it and may have to serve it—while the
polity owes its citizens the fullest measure of protection that its law affords”). There are, of
course, many alternative ways of understanding citizenship. See id. (identifying a normative
conception of citizenship that exists alongside the positive one); JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 3 (1991) (identifying four meanings of
citizenship: as “standing,” as nationality, as “active participation or ‘good’ citizenship,” and
as “ideal republican citizenship”).
METTLER, supra note 32, at 24; see also ANDREA L. CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS:
SENIOR POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 112-14 (2003) (arguing that
old-age insurance fostered an empowered, politically active senior group, which in turn
helped defend old-age insurance from threats).
METTLER, supra note 32, at 24-25.
Frank Bane, Exec. Dir., Soc. Sec. Bd., Social Security on the March, Address at RandolphMacon [Woman’s] College, Lynchburg, Va. (Apr. 16, 1937) (on file with University of
Virginia Library, Special Collections, Papers of Frank Bane, box 7).
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behind. By telling welfare workers that rights were on the line, at least when it
came to the federally subsidized forms of public assistance (Aid to the Blind,
Old Age Assistance, and Aid to Dependent Children), federal administrators
separated some individuals from the group over which state and local
governments exerted unbridled control and could expect undivided loyalty
(i.e., the recipients of state and locally funded “general relief”).272 By
emphasizing where those rights came from—namely, specific provisions in the
Social Security Act and the U.S. Constitution—they reminded competing levels
of government that these important social benefits emanated from Washington.
To be sure, this use of rights language did not signal that the federal
government embraced public assistance beneficiaries in the same way that it
embraced the retirees on Social Security; nor did it signal that federal officials
were prepared to enforce a poor individual’s rights against state and local
authorities—that would come later. But it does suggest a desire, perhaps
unconscious, on the part of certain federal administrators to raise the profile of
national government. Richard Schragger has argued that “localism claims—
claims that certain groups should be permitted to make law for themselves—
must be understood as acts of legal and spatial construction.”273 We should
apply the same logic to federal administrators’ rights language, which, with or
without the speakers’ intent, undercut such claims of local governance. This
rights language, in effect, constructed national authority274 by detaching
individuals from the local and, at the same time, orienting them toward a
distant but beneficent central state.275
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Because “general relief” remained untouched by federal policies, Susan Stein-Roggenbuck
has labeled it a “third track” in the so-called “two-track” welfare state. I share her belief that
scholars should devote more attention to this important and highly stigmatized category of
public aid. STEIN-ROGGENBUCK, supra note 140, at 8.
Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 404 (2001).
There is a large literature on how individuals came to think of themselves as members of the
American nation. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 195, at 364-68; GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN
CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 122-27 (2001); CHRISTIAN
SAMITO, BECOMING AMERICAN UNDER FIRE: IRISH AMERICANS, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND
THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2009); CARROLL SMITHROSENBERG, THIS VIOLENT EMPIRE: THE BIRTH OF AN AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 112-28
(2010). This Article suggests that in the mid-twentieth century, federal administrators may
have been important agents of nationalization. On what is distinctive about national
identity, as opposed to other forms of identity, see MILLER, supra note 36, at 17-47.
I know of no other scholar to make the argument in quite this way, but I believe it is
compatible with at least two other works on rights and governance. See LAURA F. EDWARDS,
THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY
IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 273-82 (2009) (describing how advocates of the
antebellum nullification movement in North and South Carolina used rights discourse to
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In 1940, addressing an audience of immigration reformers, federal attorney
A. Delafield Smith observed that “a strong personal bond between the
individual and the state” was “the tangible evidence of the achievement of
national identity and power.”276 It was also, he continued, an established
“technique . . . [for] bringing about national dominance” over “tribal
bonds.”277 Whether he and his colleagues knowingly applied that insight to
their daily labors is unclear, but the words themselves ring true: the modern
liberal state did not amass its authority overnight. It built that power citizen by
citizen, piece by hard-fought piece.
conclusion
Two decades after playing his little-known role in the welfare rights
movement,278 legal philosopher Bob Cover penned Violence and the Word.279
The essay reminded readers that all official interpretive commitments, whether
by judges or other “instruments of a modern nation-state,” “are realized . . . in
the flesh.”280 This Article has offered an explanation for a legal interpretation
that occurred within the administrative state. Parts I, II, and III demonstrate
that although the Social Security Act never used the word “rights,” federal
administrators spread throughout the nation the notion that the Act’s benefits
were the “right” of the recipient, and that recipients themselves had ancillary
rights—to fair process, equal treatment, privacy, and freedom from
interference. From the federal administrators’ perspective, the focus of Part IV,
this was a useful way to guide local welfare workers, whom they had no formal
means of influencing and who, in many cases, appeared to operate within an
“old poor law” framework. From the perspective of a more abstract governing
regime, taken up in Part V, this interpretation also had value: rights language
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encourage free, white men to associate with state-level authority); Marlene Wind, PostNational Citizenship in Europe: The EU as a “Welfare Rights Generator”?, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
239, 244 (2009) (“The modern notion of citizenship is about identity and belonging to a
particular national community with strongly demarcated borders. Citizens were granted
rights in virtue of being part of this narrowly defined entity. In the consolidating years of
the European nation state, there was therefore a natural exchange of loyalty for rights.”).
Smith, supra note 225, at 3.
Id.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that as an intern for the Center on
Social Welfare Policy and Law, Cover developed a persuasive argument for the futility of
pursuing federal administrative review).
Cover, supra note 11.
Id. at 1601, 1605.
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expressed a direct relationship between poor individuals and central-state
authority. It signaled that the poor were no longer local citizens first. This,
scholars have argued, is the very essence of the modern liberal state,281 and yet
we know precious little about how the change occurred. This Article suggests
one mechanism.
Moving forward in Cover’s spirit, two questions demand answers. The first
is about the consequences of federal administrators’ rights language. The
second is about the politics of rights claiming and its uninterrogated obverse.
On consequences: one possibility, left here for another day, was the
stimulation of rights-based, class-conscious activism. All rights, Judith Shklar
has written, “can be forfeited, but that does not render [them] worthless. And
even if it is not feasible to enforce the right fully, the consciousness of the claim
can have a political effect.”282 Did federal administrators’ rights language
encourage local officials to provide more generous benefits or treat welfare
recipients with more respect, perhaps fostering a sense of legitimacy and
entitlement? Historically, the expansion of central-state authority has not
necessarily, or even often, shifted power to society’s most marginal
members,283 but any rupture in the pattern of governance is a potential
moment of opportunity and an impetus to reimagine what is possible.
Extrapolating further, did federal administrators’ rights language instead
(or in addition) trigger the “backlash” against public assistance recipients that
surfaced in the early Cold War period and swept the nation in the early
1960s?284 In subsequent years, did echoes of that rights language (many federal
administrators had moved on by then to the discourse of “rehabilitation”)285
encourage the poor to expect more from the federal government, and, at last, to
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See NOVAK, supra note 265, at 241 (characterizing the modern liberal state as one in which
the society is “legally and politically oriented around the relationship of individual subjects
to a central nation-state,” while the previous regime of governance, by contrast, was built
around “the roles of associative citizens in a confederated republic”).
SHKLAR, supra note 268, at 101.
WELKE, supra note 263, at 147.
On the welfare “backlash” of the late 1940s and 1950s, see REESE, supra note 13. On the
relationship between that backlash and the discourse of rights, see Tani, supra note 13, at
177-81. See also LISA LEVENSTEIN, A MOVEMENT WITHOUT MARCHES: AFRICAN AMERICAN
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF POVERTY IN POSTWAR PHILADELPHIA 83 (2009) (characterizing
Pennsylvania’s restrictive 1950s welfare policies as a “respon[se] to women’s deliberate and
assertive use of ADC”).
On the shift in the 1950s to a discourse of rehabilitation, see MITTELSTADT, supra note 7, at
41-43; and Tani, supra note 13, at 221-55.
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loudly, publicly demand their due?286 The evidence in this Article cannot,
without more, support such claims, but at the very least, it suggests clear
linkages between the growth of the administrative state and the materialization
of a “rights revolution.”287
The second question is about the political motivations of those who are
most alarmed by assertions of rights to public benefits. Critics have long
alleged that when benefits come with rights, or are packaged as rights,
policymakers lose flexibility, taxpayers suffer, and the poor lose incentive to
work.288 The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act “ended welfare as we know it”289 in large part by
eliminating rights claims. It did this first by placing time limits on benefits,
and second, by authorizing states to condition benefits on any number of
behavioral requirements. Under the terms of the new law, welfare payments
were an incentive, not a right; their termination was an unobjectionable form
of discipline, not a rights violation.290 These changes generated broad support,
and the law continues to receive praise,291 despite mounting evidence that it has
failed to achieve many of its stated goals.292
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Cf. SPARROW, supra note 30, at 179 (noting that the Fair Employment Practices
Commission’s “[f]ailure to enforce fair employment only made those claims more insistent,
highlighting the government’s responsibility rather than negating it. . . . [T]he simple
existence of an avenue for grievance . . . legitimized the expectations of its claimants.”).
If the administrative strategies described above did lay the groundwork for the welfare
rights movement, irony abounds. This Article has argued that federal administrators
funneled rights language into local welfare offices, attempting to legitimize New Deal
welfare reform and, more generally, the modern liberal state. The welfare rights movement
exposed the ugliness built into that regime of governance: its simultaneous celebration of
equal treatment and deference to racial and economic injustice; its proclaimed regard for
individual rights and obvious disregard for human dignity. In yet another ironic twist,
conservative reaction to the welfare rights movement helped push the liberal state toward its
current form, one that differs substantially from what New Deal state-builders imagined.
For a recent iteration of this critique, see CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF MOOCHERS:
AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO GETTING SOMETHING FOR NOTHING (2011).
KATZ, supra note 2, at 1.
Lucy A. Williams, Welfare and Legal Entitlements: The Social Roots of Poverty, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 569, 570 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). For a concise
account of welfare reform in the 1990s, see KATZ, supra note 2, at 317-28.
Jason DeParle, Welfare Limits Left Poor Adrift as Recession Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/us/welfare-limits-left-poor-adrift-as-recession-hit.html
(observing that “[p]erhaps no law in the past generation has drawn more praise than the
drive to ‘end welfare as we know it’”).
See generally JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A NATION’S
DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004) (chronicling one extended family’s struggles in the
aftermath of welfare reform); KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC
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More recently, critics have denigrated claims of a right to health care.
Supporters of universal health insurance, ranging from activists293 to
legislators294 to the President,295 invoked rights language in their efforts to
secure the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. They
used other languages with even greater frequency—the languages of cost
saving, fairness, and freedom, for example—but opponents seized on the
notion of rights as representative of the Act’s flaws. As presidential hopeful
Rick Santorum explained in a February 2012 speech, the “Obamacare” right to
healthcare was in fact a tool of coercion and an invitation to dependence:
“When the government gives you rights, . . . the government can take them
away,” he warned, and “tell you how to exercise [them].”296 Other
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ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011) (arguing that welfare “cheating”
is virtually inevitable under today’s public assistance regime); JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL
HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (2007) (showing that
although welfare reform succeeded in trimming the welfare roles, it did not alleviate poverty
or insecurity); RUCKER C. JOHNSON, ARIEL KALIL & RACHEL E. DUNIFON WITH BARBARA RAY,
MOTHERS’ WORK AND CHILDREN’S LIVES: LOW-INCOME FAMILIES AFTER WELFARE REFORM
(2010) (demonstrating that one piece of the welfare reform, the work requirements, has had
harmful effects on poor families, owing to the nature of the work that is available to lowincome women).
Anja Rudiger & Benjamin Mason Meier, A Rights-Based Approach to Health Care Reform, in
RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO PUBLIC HEALTH 77 (Elvira Beracochea, Corey Weinstein &
Dabney P. Evans eds., 2011).
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1367, 1398-1401 (2011). For a more recent example, see Press Release, House Minority
Leader, Pelosi Statement on Supreme Court Decision Upholding Healthcare Reform
(June 28, 2012), http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2012/06/pelosi-statement-on
-supreme-court-decision-upholding-health-care-reform.shtml (“In passing health reform
. . . [w]e ensured health care would be a right for all, not a privilege for the few. Today, the
Supreme Court affirmed our progress and protected that right . . . .”).
President Obama did not make rights language central to his campaign for health care
reform, but when asked directly whether health care was “a privilege, a right, or a
responsibility,” he responded that it should be a “right.” Jason Linkins, Obama: Health Care
Should Be a Right, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2008/10/07/obama-health-care-should_n_132831.html.
Rachel Weiner, Rick Santorum’s Missouri Victory Speech: Full Transcript, WASH. POST:
ELECTION 2012 BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012, 11:45 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/election-2012/post/rick-santorums-missouri-victory-speech-full-transcript/2012/02/07
/gIQAGcUwxQ_blog.html; see also Michele Bachmann, Ripping Out Obamacare by the Roots:
Tyranny Disguised as Health Care Reform Endangers Freedom, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/27/ripping-out-obamacare-by-the-roots
(“Obamacare isn’t about a right to health care. It is about the government telling you what
you have to do or, more precisely, what you must purchase.”). Republican Senator Rand
Paul has gone one step further, arguing that not only does a “right to healthcare” limit the
recipient’s freedom, but it also implies that the right-holder may conscript private
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conservatives do not go so far, but agree that a government-guaranteed
entitlement to healthcare is unwise and un-American.297
Missing from the debates, this Article suggests, is a full understanding of
why some Americans are inclined to talk about national public benefits in
rights terms in the first place. Surely, material gains are relevant, as is
rhetorical advantage. But something more is at stake. To speak in the language
of rights, this Article has argued, is to speak to central-state power in a shared
language, a language that historically has bypassed state and local
intermediaries to demand the perquisites of national citizenship. With this
insight, we should look harder at efforts to detach public benefits from rights
in the American lexicon. Surely such efforts reflect, as their proponents claim,
concerns about wasting taxpayer resources and rewarding irresponsibility—but
do they also manifest a desire to disaffiliate potential rights-claimers from the
national government? Are they a bid to restore vulnerable Americans to the
jurisdiction of other authorities, such as more proximate levels of government
(as this Article has emphasized),298 or private charities,299 or the market?300 We
still have much to learn about the language of rights, and even more to learn
about those who oppose it.
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physicians. In Paul’s words, “It means you believe in slavery.” Tony Pierce, Rand Paul Says
People Who Support Universal Healthcare “Believe in Slavery,” L.A. TIMES: TOP OF THE TICKET
(May 12, 2011, 7:17 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/05/rand-paul
-says-people-who-support-universal-health-care-believe-in-slavery.html; see also Richard
M. Salsman, Memo to the Supreme Court: Health Care Is Not a Right, FORBES,
Apr. 3, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardsalsman/2012/04/03/memo-to-the-supreme
-court-health-care-is-not-a-right (“Consumers allegedly have a ‘right’ to what health care
providers provide, a ‘right’ to say what will be provided, when, and at what price. . . . [T]his
is a form of slavery.”).
See Michael Finnegan, Romney’s Critiques of Europe Could Backfire, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2012,
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